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LAW REVIEW
SUSAN J. BECKER*
Public Opinion Polls and Surveys as
Evidence: Suggestions for Resolving
Confusing and Conflicting
Standards Governing Weight
and Admissibility
P UBLIC opinion polls and other survey data have attained a
unique status in the world of evidence. Once scorned as inad-
missible hearsay, survey evidence is now not only routinely admit-
ted in many cases, but assigned such high probative value as to be
largely determinative of key issues in litigation.
In motions in limine, sidebar conferences, post trial motions, and
appellate briefs, litigants debate the relevance and reliability, and
hence the admissibility and weight, of survey results. Refereeing
the debate inevitably requires a detailed and sometimes onerous
analysis of the methodology used to produce the survey data which
rests at the center of the controversy.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. B.A. 1977, East-
ern Kentucky University. J.D. 1983, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The author
wishes to thank Chris Lakin Hurlbut and Barbara Kacir, whose unfailing support and
inspiration made this Article possible.
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Despite an abundance of judicial opinions and scholarly works
published on the subject of survey results as evidence,' a number of
issues remain unresolved. The exact "rules" governing the conduct
of litigants and their respective counsel in commissioning and exe-
cuting a survey and those governing the courts' refereeing of eviden-
tiary disputes over polling data remain unclear. The specific areas
of confusion or conflict which this Article addresses are: (1) the ap-
propriateness of the "weight versus admissibility" standard used in
some instances to admit seriously flawed survey results; (2) the util-
ity of Federal Rule of Evidence 703 as a vehicle for streamlining the
admission of survey data; (3) the wisdom of requiring mandatory
disclosure of a litigant's intent to commission a survey prior to plan-
ning and execution; (4) the ramifications of prohibiting attorney in-
volvement in the design of the survey questionnaire and other
aspects of the polling process; (5) the propriety of conditioning ad-
missibility of survey data upon a "showing of necessity," i.e., that it
is the most probative evidence on a particular point; and (6) the
value of establishing different standards of admissibility for polls
which measure objective data and those which record subjective im-
pressions of the respondents.2 These unresolved issues are dis-
cussed seriatim in Section II. Suggestions for moving toward a
I See, e.g., Davis, Identifying Uses of Custom Consumer Research in Products Liabil-
ity, 9 J. PROD. LIAB. 329 (1986); Evans & Gunn, Trademark Survey Evidence, 20 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1 (1989); Glassman, Community Standard of Patent Offensiveness: Public
Opinion Data and Obscenity Law, 42 PUB. OPINION Q. 161 (1978); Lipton, A New Look
at the Use of Social Science Evidence in Trademark Litigation, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 32
(1988); Robin & Barnaby, Trademark Surveys-Heads you Lose, Tails They Win, 73
TRADEMARK REP. 436 (1983); Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL
L.Q. 322 (1960); Note, Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: The Pollsters Go To Court,
66 HARV. L. REV. 498 (1953) [hereinafter Note, Public Opinion Surveys]; Note, Opinion
Polls and the Law of Evidence, 62 VA. L. REV. 1101 (1976) [hereinafter Note, Opinion
Polls]; see also, Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Surveys or Polls of Public or
Consumers' Opinion, Recognition, Preference, or the Like, 76 A.L.R.2d 619 (1961).
2 This Article does not address all unresolved issues relating to the use of polling and
survey evidence. For example, the issue of whether polls or surveys conducted for liti-
gation are discoverable, regardless of whether the commissioning party intends to intro-
duce the results at trial, is still open to debate, but is not addressed here. This problem
was recognized at least as early as 1960, see Handbook of Recommended Proceduresfor
the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 430 (1960), and courts continue to wrestle
with it. See, e.g., Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 683, 686 (W.D. Pa. 1979) ("If and
when defense counsel determine that they intend" to use results of a survey of female
employees at trial of an employment discrimination claim, defendant is compelled to
produce survey results to plaintiffs); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (limiting dis-
covery of facts known and opinions held by a non-testifying expert retained in anticipa-
tion of litigation or preparation for trial to situations where a showing is made of
"exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discov-
ery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means").
[Vol. 70, 1991]
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more uniform and more practical method of evaluating the admissi-
bility and weight of survey data are set forth in Section III.
To understand fully the implication of these issues, which repeat-
edly confront modem courts and litigants, an understanding of the
growth in the use and acceptability of surveys, among both social
scientists and legalists, is useful if not necessary. Accordingly, Sec-
tion I provides a basic overview of public opinion polls, beginning
with a brief explanation of the current popularity of this type of
data, followed by a discussion of the courts' historic treatment of
survey evidence and a review of modem standards which courts use
in evaluating the weight and admissibility of polling data.3
I
HISTORIC OVERVIEW AND MODERN STATUS OF
PUBLIC OPINION POLLS
A. The Growing Popularity of Survey Data
"The measurement of public opinion is, in its simplest form, find-
ing out what people think."4 This task, at first blush, seems an ele-
mentary one, especially to the generations of Americans for whom
names like "Gallup" and "Roper" are household words. But closer
study reveals that the task of accurately measuring and analyzing
public perception of an event, a tangible item, or a controversial
issue is indeed a difficult one, filled with traps capable of ensnaring
the seasoned veteran as well as the novice pollster.'
Concerted efforts by academicians and researchers from a variety
of disciplines, including sociology, psychology, marketing, econom-
ics, advertising, anthropology, journalism, political science, and sta-
tistics, have greatly advanced the "science," and arguably the
3 At the outset, a distinction should perhaps be drawn between polls designed to elicit
public opinion or perception ("subjective" responses) and surveys which collect infor-
mation which is, at least in theory, capable of external verification ("objective" data).
This distinction is illustrated by a comparison of cases wherein survey results reflecting
"objective" data were at issue, such as Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550
(7th Cir. 1980) (survey offered through the testimony of a geologist purported to
demonstrate the number of homes damaged by defendant's blasting operation and the
extent of damage to each), and decisions where the survey being scrutinized by the court
compiled subjective data, such as Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (public's percep-
tion of the use of the word "propaganda" in statute sought). Further discussion is pro-
vided in Section II on the rationale for declining to make the objective/subjective
distinction.
4 B. HENNESSY, PUBLIC OPINION 59 (2d ed. 1970).
5 The prediction that Dewey would defeat Truman in the 1948 presidential election
represents a classic case of pollster error. For a thorough discussion of this event, see
W. ALBIG, MODERN PUBLIC OPINION 222-26 (1956).
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accuracy, of polling techniques.6 Despite these advances, one writer
still defines public opinion polling as "a partial quantification of
some aspects of what some people say their opinions are about cer-
tain questions about which they have been asked." 7 Even more in-
sightful in the context of using polling data as evidence is the
skepticism which led another author to opine that "[i]t is possible to
make a survey prove anything. It is just a matter of picking the
right people or establishments to survey, and framing the questions
so that the desired answers will be obtained." 8
Notwithstanding skepticism about public opinion polls and simi-
lar surveys, their popularity continues to grow primarily because
they are efficient.
Despite repeated criticisms, polls and surveys continue to
flourish in number and influence. The reason for their success is
simple. They combine two things: the ancient but extremely effi-
cient method of obtaining information from people by asking
questions; and modem random sampling procedures that allow a
relatively small number of such people to represent a much
larger population. 9
Moreover, as social scientists have improved survey accuracy and
trustworthiness, the courts have become increasingly receptive to
the use of survey evidence. Indeed, the courts' attitudes have
changed drastically since the early 1950s, when one commentator
observed: "[T]hus far polls have not been generally accepted by the
courts."' 0 In sharp contrast, the following passage, explaining the
6 A. BLANKENSHIP, CONSUMER AND OPINION RESEARCH: THE QUESTIONNAIRE
TECHNIQUE ix (1st ed. 1943); B. HENNESSY, supra note 4, at 84-92. As one social
scientist explains:
Survey research is not itself an academic discipline, with a common language,
a common set of principles for evaluating new ideas, and a well-organized
professional reference group. Lacking such an organization, the field has
evolved through the somewhat independent and uncoordinated contributions
of researchers trained as statisticians, psychologists, political scientists, and
sociologists.
R. GROVES, SURVEY ERRORS AND SURVEY COSTS 1 (1989) (footnote omitted). For a
comprehensive view of social scientists' approaches to and opinions of modem survey-
ing techniques, see 1 SURVEYING SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA (C. Turner & E. Martin
eds. 1984) (Volumes I and II).
7 W. ALBIG, supra note 5, at 198.
8 A. BLANKENSHIP, supra note 6, at 215 (quoting THE SALES MANAGER'S HAND-
BOOK 225 (J. Aspley ed. 1934)).
9 H. SCHUMAN & S. PRESSER, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS IN ATTITUDE SURVEYS:
EXPERIMENTS ON QUESTION FORM, WORDING, AND CONTEXT 1 (1981).
10 Note, Public Opinion Surveys, supra note 1, at 499. One court expressed its skepti-
cism thusly: "Surveys and polls are inconclusive enough at best ... [even] under opti-
mum conditions." Rimmeir v. Dickson, 107 So.2d 372, 374 (Fla. 1958).
[Vol. 70, 1991]
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court's approval of the admission of survey evidence to establish
consequential damages in a complex breach of contract case, re-
flects the attitude of the modern courts:
In arriving at this conclusion, we recognize that statistically
reliable surveys are an acceptable tool used regularly in formulat-
ing highly sophisticated business decisions. They are an accepted
method of determining truth as perceived through the collective
judgement of enormous segments of the population. Given the
verity that surveys are accorded in everyday life, we see no rea-
son to exclude them from the consideration of the trier of fact in
a complex case such as the one at hand. 1
In civil and criminal cases alike, survey evidence today enjoys a
fairly high degree of success in terms of admissibility and probative
value. It has been proffered to resolve a plethora of factual and
legal issues, including, but by no means limited to, the amount of
damages suffered due to defendant's violation of antitrust laws;' 2
deceptive or unfair advertising in Federal Trade Commission pro-
ceedings and private causes of action; 13 the constitutional validity of
federal statutes;14 the proper definition of E.P.A. regulations;"' the
American public's distrust of political action committees; 16 the un-
representative nature of a particular grand jury selection; 1' the al-
legedly "adulterated" nature of the orange juice sold by
defendant;'" the impact which defendant-columnist's alleged defam-
atory statements had on plaintiff's reputation and career as a polit-
ical science professor;' 9 the inherent bias of potential jurors against
a criminal defendant which would negate the possibility of a fair
" Liberty Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40, 55
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
12 American Bearing Co. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1163, 1174-75 (E.D. Pa.
1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 943 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984).
13 Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1982); Litton In-
dus., Inc. v. F.T.C., 676 F.2d 364, 372-73 (9th Cir. 1982).
14 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
15 Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. E.P.A., 598 F.2d 228, 231 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
16 Democratic Party of the United States v. National Conservative PAC, 578 F.
Supp. 797, 824-27 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub norm. Federal
Election Comm'n v. National Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
17 United States v. Van Allen, 208 F. Supp. 331, 334-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966).
18 United States v. 88 Cases, More or Less, Containing Bireley's Orange Beverage,
187 F.2d 967, 974-75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
19 Ollman v. Evans, 713 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1983), aff'd on rehearing, 750 F.2d 970
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
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trial in the challenged venue; and the community standards
against which material should be judged obscene.2
In addition to giving due consideration to surveys conducted ex-
pressly for litigation, courts and other entities seeking guidance on
issues touching on public policy and/or community standards often
consult existing polling data22 or, in rare instances, resort to com-
missioning polls themselves.23
The foregoing list of survey uses shows the variety of applications
for this type of evidence. However, the reader should not be misled
20 Paradis v. Arave, 667 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-69 (D. Idaho 1987); Irvin v. State, 66
So.2d 288 (Fla. 1953) (en banc), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1954).
21 Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888
(1980).
22 Existing polling data is generally proffered into evidence as material on which an
expert relied in reaching his conclusion. In Riddick v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 784 F.2d
521, 541-42 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986), for example, the appellate
tribunal affirmed the trial court's decision that mandatory busing would not help abate
segregation problems in the city schools. The court's finding was based primarily on the
results of a Gallup Poll, and on an expert's interpretation thereof, showing that parental
involvement was the "most significant factor" in the well-being of the students and that
busing would further exacerbate the lack of parental involvement. Id. at 529. See also
Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1145 (1986)
(public opinion data on death penalty cited in challenge to systematically excluding
jurors who expressed moral qualms about the penalty); United States v. Van Allen, 208
F. Supp. 331, 334-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. United
States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966) (Gallup
and Roper surveys showing area demographics submitted in unsuccessful challenge to
composition of grand jury).
Members of Congress have specifically instructed the Federal Trade Commission to
include an analysis of existing "public opinion polls and other relevant information" in
the agency's biannual report on cigarette labeling and advertising required by Section
8(a) of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1990).
See S. REP. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2652, 2662-63.
On another front, legal scholars have commissioned surveys in an effort to influence
lawmakers and judicial officers to rethink long-held positions in particular areas of law.
See, e.g., Dressier, Survey of School Principals Regarding Alleged Homosexual Teachers
in the Classroom: How Likely (Really) is Discharge?, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 599
(1985).
For a comprehensive listing of sources of existing survey data, as well as a discussion
of special problems which may arise when existing survey data is used, see K. KIECOLT
& L. NATHAN, SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA (1985).
23 In Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 976-77 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank,
J., dissenting), one member of the three judge panel sought guidance in resolving the
issue of the likelihood of confusion between Seventeen magazine and girdles marketed
under the name "Miss 17" by posing the question to women at random. This approach
was apparently not accepted by the majority, as the "survey" results are reported in a
dissent. See also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd mem., 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (antitrust case in which Court selected and
contacted about 3% of the shoe manufacturers listed in an industry directory).
[Vol. 70, 1991]
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into thinking that the courts' struggle with the utility and credibility
of public opinion polls and surveys has ended. In January, 1991, an
Iowa appellate court noted that it had searched the law of that juris-
diction in vain for a standard against which the trial court's admis-
sion of certain public opinion poll evidence should be measured.24
The challenged survey was admitted in this personal in-
jury/negligence action to demonstrate the public's general lack of
awareness of the danger associated with electrical power lines. The
court ultimately adopted the standards for survey trustworthiness
articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Lutheran Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. United States,25 and found that the survey in question
satisfied those standards.26 And, as recently as 1985, an Indiana
court described the admissibility of public opinion polls as an issue
of first impression in that jurisdiction.27
The modem courts' continuing struggle with the admissibility
and weight to be accorded survey evidence is deeply rooted in the
common law prohibition against admission of hearsay evidence.
The historic underpinnings of the lengthy battle fought by propo-
nents of survey data to gain respect for this type of evidence still
surface in continued skirmishes over contemporary applications of
survey evidence. The evolution, perhaps more aptly phrased the
revolution, in judicial thinking on the issue of survey evidence is
recounted immediately below.
24 Decker v. Iowa Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., No. 0-401/89-1737, slip op. at 6 (Iowa
Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1991).
25 816 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1987).
26 Decker, No. 0-401/89-1737, slip op. at 6-7. For a survey to be trustworthy, it
must be shown:
(1) that a proper "universe" was examined and a representative sample was
chosen; (2) that the persons conducting the survey were experts; (3) that the
data were properly gathered and accurately reported; (4) that the sample de-
sign, the questionnaires, and the manner of interviewing met the standards of
objective surveying statistical techniques; and (5) that the interviewers, as well
as the respondents, were unaware of the purpose of the survey.
Id. (citations omitted). These standards track closely those set forth in Pittsburgh Press
Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978).
27 Saliba v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1181, 1189 (Ind. App.), petition for transfer denied, 484
N.E.2d 1295 (Ind. 1985). The novelty of the evidence at issue resulted in a lengthy
analysis by the appellate court of the historical treatment of survey evidence and mod-
em rationales for its admission, and a separate concurrence by one of the three appellate
judges. Id. at 1191-92 (Sullivan, J., concurring). The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Indiana, joined by one of his colleagues, wrote a stinging dissent when the
majority of that court refused to review the appellate tribunal's treatment of the survey
evidence. 484 N.E.2d at 1295 (Givan, C.J., dissenting).
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B. The Historic Perspective-Overcoming the Hearsay Objection
An individual's response to a question posed by a pollster argua-
bly falls within the classic definition of "hearsay" evidence.2" Ac-
cordingly, the traditional objection to polling evidence was (and in
some cases remains) that such evidence is inherently untrustworthy
due to its hearsay nature.29 In the 1928 decision Elgin National
Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co.,3 ° for example, a plaintiff claiming
trademark infringement attempted to introduce, through an affida-
vit prepared by an advertising firm executive, the results of a mail
survey of 2000 retail jewelers throughout the United States. Ac-
cording to the affidavit, the survey results conclusively demon-
strated that "Elgin," used in connection with the manufacture and
sale of time pieces, meant a product manufactured by the plaintiff.
While the court acknowledged the "practical difficulties" of call-
ing "numerous witness from all the different parts of the United
States" to establish what a nationally-known trade name denotes,
3 1
it nonetheless refused to accept plaintiff's "innovation with respect
to such proof."' 32 In essence, the Elgin court feared that it might
deliver the fatal blow to the rule prohibiting admission of hearsay
evidence if the survey results, representing out-of-court statements
by 2000 declarants, were admitted.
Other courts viewed polling evidence as presenting multiple hear-
say problems. For example, in the 1953 case of Irvin v. State,3
Florida's highest court upheld the trial court's exclusion at a venue
hearing of a poll conducted by the Roper organization. The results
of the poll purportedly established that a black defendant accused
of raping a white woman could not get a fair trial in the county
where the alleged crime was committed. The defendant sought to
offer the survey results through the testimony of the Roper research
executive who supervised the study. Since defendant proffered
neither the testimony of the persons who actually conducted the
28 FED. R. EvID. 801(c), as well as state rules modeled after the federal set, define
hearsay evidence as: "[A] statement, other than one made by the declarant while testi-
fying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."
29 See, e.g., Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 819
(1951); United States v. 88 Cases, More or Less, Containing Bireley's Orange Beverage,
187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951); American Coop. Serum Ass'n
v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946).
30 26 F.2d 376 (D. Del. 1928).
31 Id. at 377.
32
1d.
33 66 So.2d 288 (Fla. 1953) (en banc), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1954).
[Vol. 70, 1991]
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interviews, nor the testimony of individuals who responded to the
questions, the Roper executive's testimony was, in the court's opin-
ion, properly excluded as "hearsay based upon hearsay."
34
Attempts to avoid exclusion of polling evidence on hearsay
grounds proved cumbersome for the parties and the courts. In one
trademark infringement case, the party which proffered the polling
evidence called forty-five of the survey respondents to testify at
trial, along with the persons who conducted the interviews." Based
upon this parade of witnesses, an exasperated court concluded that
"[t]he hearsay objection is not well taken."36 In another trademark
action, the defendant overcame the hearsay objection by subpoena-
ing seventeen respondents to testify as to the method in which a
survey was conducted."
Certainly, parading dozens of interviewers and respondents
through the witness stand proved to be an inefficient and unwieldy
method of dispelling the untrustworthiness concern underlying the
prohibition of "hearsay" survey evidence. Indeed, it may have been
more efficient to abandon the survey altogether in favor of calling
the would-be respondents to answer the survey questions under
oath during trial.
In order to overcome the courts' hearsay concerns, advocates of
survey evidence espoused several theories of admissibility to which
the courts responded with varying degrees of acceptance. One ar-
gument was that survey results are not hearsay because they are not
offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to
establish the respondents' beliefs as to the particular matter as-
serted.3" This argument was used in a condemnation case brought
by the United States government against a beverage distributor for
alleged adulteration of its product.39 In that case, the defendant
surveyed consumers by having them taste the beverage at issue and
then asking what the beverage was. The majority of respondents
34 Id. at 291.
35 Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1958).
36 Id. at 75; see also Life Savers Corip. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 87 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Ill.
1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d 4 (7th Cir. 1950) (in trademark action, seventy-five or eighty
witnesses testified that they had accidentally picked up defendant's product when they
meant to buy Life Savers).
37 Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 134 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1943).
38 See United States v. 88 Cases, More or Less, Containing Bireley's Orange Bever-
age, 187 F.2d 967, 974 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951); Sunbeam Corp. v.
Sunbeam Furniture Corp., 134 F. Supp. 614, 619 (N.D. Ill. 1955); Household Fin.
Corp. v. Federal Fin. Corp., 105 F. Supp. 164, 166 (D. Ariz. 1952).
3988 Cases, 187 F.2d at 974.
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answered, "Orange juice." The court rejected the government's
hearsay objection to survey evidence, since statements of the per-
sons interviewed were not offered for the truthfulness of the asser-
tions as to the composition of the beverage at issue, but were offered
to establish "as a fact the reaction of ordinary householders and
others of the public generally when shown a bottle" of the
beverage.'
Other courts criticized the "non-hearsay" argument because sur-
vey evidence is frequently offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. This is especially true where the survey is designed to
prove the existence of a specific attitude or belief held by members
of the public. 1 Accordingly, when the public's belief or perception
is at issue, litigants proffering survey results have relied upon appli-
cation of exceptions to the hearsay rule. The "state of mind" excep-
tion, now codified as Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3),42 has often
been chosen as an appropriate vehicle for admission of such survey
results.43
In Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc.," a case
which was a turning point in the judiciary's perception of survey
40 Id. Another court branded a survey as "non-hearsay" because the primary pur-
pose for which it was offered was to impeach the opponent's survey evidence. See Brad-
ley v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 3d 156, 163, 384 N.E.2d 746, 751
(1978) (survey offered by defendant to impeach credibility of plaintiff's survey "would
not have been offered to prove its truth," thus "the survey would not constitute
hearsay").
41 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, 216 F. Supp. 670, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
see also Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 522 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987)
(distinguishing between responses to survey, such as "this is a Zebco reel," which are
not hearsay because they are not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and
"this looks like a Zebco reel," which is hearsay because it is offered for the truth of the
matter asserted on the critical issue of whether the public perceives defendant's reel as
closely resembling the reel manufactured by plaintiff).
42 FED. R. EVID. 803(3) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant
is available as a witness:
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identifi-
cation, or terms of declarant's will.
43 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 930-31 (7th Cir.
1984); Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510, 520 (10th
Cir. 1976); Zippo, 216 F. Supp. at 682; Bradley, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 164, 384 N.E.2d at
752.
44 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
[Vol. 70, 1991]
HeinOnline  -- 70 Or. L. Rev. 472 1991
Public Opinion Polls and Surveys
evidence, the manufacturer of the popular "Zippo" cigarette lighter
sued an importer of lighters for trademark infringement and unfair
competition. Plaintiff had the burden of showing that the copied
features in defendant's lighters were likely to cause prospective pur-
chasers to think defendant's lighters were manufactured by plaintiff.
To meet this burden, plaintiff proffered three surveys, including one
in which respondents were shown the lighter imported by defendant
and asked to identify the manufacturer of the lighter. A significant
number of respondents identified defendant's lighter as a "Zippo"
lighter.45
Even though the Zippo court agreed that the survey evidence was
hearsay, defendant's efforts to exclude the survey results from evi-
dence were unsuccessful. In its oft-cited decision, the court
explained:
The answer of a respondent that he thinks an unmarked lighter is
a Zippo is relevant to the issue of secondary meaning only if, in
fact, the respondent really does believe that the unmarked lighter
is a Zippo. Under this view, therefore, answers in a survey
should be regarded as hearsay.
Regardless of whether the surveys in this case could be admit-
ted under the non-hearsay approach, they are admissible because
the answers of respondents are expressions of presently existing
state of mind, attitude, or belief. There is a recognized exception
to the hearsay rule for such statements, and under it the state-
ments are admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted
therein."
In addition to the existing state of mind exception,47 other recog-
nized exceptions to the hearsay rule, primarily the "present sense
impression"48 and residual hearsay exceptions,49 have been cited as
45 1d. at 680-81.
46 Id. at 683 (footnote omitted).
47 For text of the codified version of the state of mind hearsay exception, FED. R.
EVID. 803(3), see supra note 42.
48 FED. R. EVID. 803(1) allows admission of "[a] statement describing or explaining
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition,
or immediately thereafter." This exception is readily applicable to situations where re-
spondents are questioned on their perception of, or reaction to, a physical object or
objects displayed to them by the interviewer. The respondents' "contemporaneous re-
ports would be allowable under Rule 803(1)." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
SECOND § 21.484, at 89 (1985) (hereinafter 1985 MANUAL).
49 FED. R. EVID. 803(24) provides for admission of:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
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grounds for the admission of survey evidence.5° In its seminal deci-
sion on the admissibility of polling evidence, Pittsburgh Press Club
v. United States," the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit aptly
summarized the modem view of the hearsay rule as it applies to
public opinion polls:
While some polls are not hearsay in that they are admitted to
show the beliefs or attitudes of the respondents (as opposed to
the truth of the respondents' answers), other polls are unques-
tionably hearsay.
Such hearsay polls are not necessarily inadmissible as evidence
in that they may fall into a recognized class exception to the
hearsay rule, as, for example, when they involve a present sense
impression or a presently existing state of mind. If a survey or
poll does not fit into one of the class exceptions to the hearsay
rule, it may nevertheless be admissible under Fed. R. Evid.
803(24). In other words, the survey is admissible if it is material;
if it is more probative on the issue than any other evidence; and if
it has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent
to those of the class exceptions.... The proponent of such evi-
dence, of course, has the burden of establishing these elements of
admissibility.52
In recognition of the conceptual difficulties involved in the hear-
say/non-hearsay classification of survey evidence, the advisory
committee notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which rule allows
the admissibility of expert opinion testimony even where the opin-
ion is based on non-admissible hearsay matters,5 3 suggest that Rule
703 offers "a more satisfactory basis for ruling upon the admissibil-
ity of public opinion poll evidence." 54 However, Rule 703 has not
proven a viable route for the admissibility of survey evidence."5
Regardless of which vehicle the proponent of survey evidence
chooses, a court confronted with whether to admit a particular sur-
vey usually engages in a detailed analysis of the many steps involved
in conducting the survey, seeking to identify sources of error or bias
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best
be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
50 Although only applicable in limited circumstances, some surveys qualify for ad-
mission under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Bradley v.
Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 3d 156, 165, 384 N.E.2d 746, 752 (1978); see
also FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
51 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978).
52 Id. at 757-58 (footnotes and citations omitted).
53 FED. R. EVID. 703 allows the admission of expert testimony if the expert's opinion
is based on data "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject ... 
54
FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
55 See infra notes 157-169 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 70, 1991]
HeinOnline  -- 70 Or. L. Rev. 474 1991
Public Opinion Polls and Surveys
which would taint the proffered results or even render them irrele-
vant. Evidentiary standards against which the reliability of a par-
ticular survey is measured are set forth in the following section.
C. Modern Standards Governing Admissibility: Searching for
Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness
1. General Case Law Standards
No single authority governs the admissibility and weight of pol-
ling data in either state or federal courts. When evaluating the ad-
missibility of survey evidence over hearsay objections, modem
courts frequently rely on the general guidelines set forth in the
Zippo decision,56 the 1960 Handbook of Recommended Procedures
for the Trial of Protracted Cases," the five subsequent editions of
the Manual for Complex Litigation published by the Federal Judi-
cial Center, 8 the Pittsburgh Press Club 9 decision, and the various
decisions interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 703. With the ex-
ception of federal courts within the Third Circuit, which are bound
by the Pittsburgh Press Club decision, courts are free to-and do-
pick and choose among the criteria suggested by these sources in
determining whether a particular poll is worthy of admissibility
and/or substantial weight.'
Regardless of the source consulted, modern courts evaluate the
admissibility and, if admissible, the weight to be accorded particular
survey results by juxtaposing standards for survey methodology de-
veloped and accepted by social scientists with methodology em-
ployed to produce the proffered results. Vigorous debate over the
validity of methodology ensues between litigants and their respec-
56 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see
supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
57 25 F.R.D. 351, 425-430 (1960).
58 The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION has been published in 1970, 1973, 1977,
1981 and 1985.
59 Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978).
60 A court's decision as to which source to adopt may be determinative of the admis-
sibility and weight accorded a particular poll. This is due to the conflicts between the
various sources on key points, such as the acceptable degree of attorney involvement,
the requirement of a party's intent to conduct a survey prior to its design and execution,
and other issues of similar magnitude which are discussed in detail in Section II. Some
courts cite select propositions from several sources without recognizing, much less at-
tempting to reconcile, the conflicting standards contained therein. See, e.g., Boehringer
Ingeiheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Laboratories, 532 F. Supp. 1040, 1057-58 (D.N.J.
1980) (relying on excerpts from both the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION and
Pittsburgh Press Club to evaluate a survey).
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tive experts, culminating in arguments supporting or decrying the
verity of the survey results.
Despite the subtleties of the particular point to which a survey is
addressed, the same "core" issues, which focus on each step of the
survey process, are raised in every case. The chronological steps
subjected to close scrutiny are (1) determining the purpose of the
study and identifying the information desired; (2) identifying the
universe of potential respondents; (3) selecting the universe size and
type; (4) constructing the questionnaire; (5) recruiting and training
the interviewers; (6) testing the survey; (7) revising the survey to
correct problems which surfaced during pretesting; (8) collecting
the answers; (9) processing, summarizing, and analyzing the tests;
and (10) presenting the conclusions gleaned from the survey data.6 1
Although all stages of survey design and execution are critical,
courts most often find fatal flaws in the preliminary steps of uni-
verse selection and question preparation. These two steps are dis-
cussed in further detail below.
(a) The Proper Universe
The cost of surveying every member of a population whose views
arguably reflect public opinion-for example, inquiring as to candi-
date preference of every citizen registered to vote in the next presi-
dential election-is clearly prohibitive. The obvious objective of
public opinion surveys is, therefore, to obtain responses from a se-
lect number of persons ("the sample") who are representatives of
the whole group of people ("the universe") about whom one wants
information.62
It is not the size per se of the sample which causes or guarantees
against error; rather, the determinative factor is whether the sample
selected is representative of the larger universe whose ideas or infor-
mation the pollster seeks to discover.63 Representativeness is in-
61 See generally A. BLANKENSHIP, supra note 6, at 18-19; R. GROVES, supra note 6;
B. HENNESSY, supra note 4, at 93; E. LEE, R. FORTHOFER & R. LORIMER, ANALYZ-
ING COMPLEX SURVEY DATA (1989); S. SUDMAN & N. BRADBURN, ASKING QUES-
TIONS (1982).
62 B. HENNESSY, supra note 4, at 92. For a more complete discussion of types of
sampling, including simple random sampling, systematic sampling, stratified sampling,
and cluster sampling, see E. LEE, R. FORTHOFER & R. LORIMER, supra note 61.
63 As one expert explains, "The size of the sample is not the major source of error in
most opinion surveys. When errors occur, in almost every case it is not because too few
persons were interviewed, but because the wrong persons were wrongly interviewed."
B. HENNESSY, supra note 4, at 95.
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sured through random selection of respondents," or through a
combination of randomness and stratification.65
Selection of a non-representative sample is often cited as grounds
for exclusion of survey evidence.66 For example, in United States v.
Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,67 the court held
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony of
survey results where only fifteen individuals, whose hostility toward
the leadership of the union was already known, were polled as to
the leadership's reputation for violence and economic retribution.68
While noting that technical flaws usually affect the weight rather
than the admissibility of survey results, the court relied on Federal
Rule of Evidence 40369 in holding that where a survey is "deliber-
ately partisan in its limited sampling, the prejudicial effect of such a
flawed survey substantially outweighs any probative value it may
64 Randomness means that every unit in the universe has an equal chance of being
drawn into the sample. Id. at 97; A. BLANKENSHIP, supra note 6, at 98. Lack of
randomness has been identified with the case of inaccurate results obtained from "straw
votes" used as early as 1824 to measure voter preference for political candidates. W.
ALBIG, supra note 5, at 178. In 1936, for example, The Literary Digest sent ten million
"ballots" to people on mailing lists compiled from telephone directories and automobile
registration lists. Nearly 2.4 million were returned. Based on this data, The Literary
Digest predicted that Landon would become the next U.S. President by culling 59.1%
of the popular vote, representing 370 electoral votes. In fact, Roosevelt received 60.2%
of the popular vote, sweeping to victory with 523 of the 531 electoral votes. Id. at 180.
The fatal flaw in The Literary Digest's poll, according to Dr. George Gallup, Archibald
Crossley, and other experts, was lack of random selection. Id. at 181-82. This was
because (1) the mailing lists disproportionately represented the upper-income strata of
the voting population, and (2) a high percentage of lower-income voters cast their bal-
lots because economic conditions were a critical issue in 1936. Id. at 180.
65 B. HENNESSY, supra note 4, at 97. Stratification is the division of the universe
along demographic lines or by other set criteria to identify the group of respondents
whose opinions are relevant to the matter being investigated. Id. at 97-98. Blankenship
refers to the stratification process as "controlled sampling." A. BLANKENSHIP, supra
note 6, at 22, 102-07.
66 See, e.g., Hawley Prods. Co. v. United States Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69, 77 (1st Cir.
1958) (improper universe grounds for exclusion); Delgado v. McTighe, 91 F.R.D. 76,
80-81 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (survey inadmissible when expert could not testify with certainty
that responses were representative of universe); Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass.
796, 374 N.E.2d 1216 (1978) (survey excluded in obscenity trial because offer of proof
failed to demonstrate the representativeness of the persons interviewed). But cf
Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1982)
(survey of children ages six to twelve was satisfactory basis for trial court's decision that
likelihood of confusion existed between the manufacturer of "General Lee" toy car and
the sponsor of television show "Dukes of Hazzard," in which similar car was featured).
67 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
6 8 Id. at 277.
69 FED. R. EvID. 403 states in part: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
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have. "71
Evidence of survey results may also be excluded where inquiry is
made of the wrong group of respondents. For example, in the Sec-
ond Circuit's American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co. 71
decision, the court reasoned that former purchasers of hiking boots,
who did not necessarily have any present interest in purchasing
boots, constituted an improper universe regarding the issue of
whether consumers would likely be confused as to the manufacturer
of a particular boot.72
In contrast, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc. ,7
dramatically illustrates the persuasive impact of a properly defined
universe. The plaintiff in that trademark infringement and unfair
competition matter had the burden of proving that features copied
from plaintiff's cigarette lighter caused prospective purchasers to
(incorrectly) regard defendant's lighter as one manufactured by
plaintiff.74 To meet its burden, plaintiff commissioned three sepa-
rate surveys with a sample size of about 500 smokers each.7  The
samples had been selected on the basis of Census Bureau data,
which aided in the identification of fifty-three metropolitan and
non-metropolitan localities.76 The pollsters then selected 100 clus-
ters within these localities (each consisting of 150 to 250 dwelling
units) from which the respondents were selected.77 In concluding
that the survey results established not only the likelihood of confu-
sion between the two lighters, but actual confusion as well,78 the
court opined that the results of the well-designed surveys were "ap-
proximately the same as would be obtained if each of the
115,000,000 [American cigarette smokers] were interviewed.
79
(b) The Proper Question(s)
As any attorney who has ever struggled with the correct phrasing
and order of questions posed during a deposition or trial knows,
7 0 Local 560, 780 F.2d at 277.
71 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980).
7 2 1d. at 660-61 n.4; see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d
112, 118 (2d Cir. 1984); American Luggage Works v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F.
Supp. 50, 52 (D. Mass. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1958).
73 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
74 1d. at 679.
7 5 Id. at 681.
76
Id.
77 Id.
7 8 Id. at 691.
79 Id. at 684.
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asking a properly formed question is critical in obtaining the desired
response. In such situations, a certain amount of latitude is given
which allows the attorney to lead the witness toward a specific an-
swer. In conducting a survey, however, the use of leading or other-
wise biased questions has repeatedly been cited as grounds for
according the survey results little weight or for excluding the results
altogether. 0
For example, in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Sweets Laboratories,"' a
trademark case, a witness testified that twenty-six of the sixty
housewives interviewed incorrectly thought that "Ivoryne" chewing
gum was produced by plaintiff, the manufacturer of Ivory soap. In
rejecting the witness' conclusion that confusion existed as to the
manufacturer of the gum, the court held that the questions posed
not only led the respondents to the answer desired by the plaintiff,
but also created a game-type atmosphere. The court concluded:
It is obvious from the testimony of the witness that those house-
wives made a deliberate effort to associate appellee's trade-mark
"Ivoryne" with some other well-known trade-mark. The inter-
view to which they were subjected may properly, we think, be
likened to a radio quiz program where those being interviewed
make every effort to give the desired answers to the questions
propounded.82
Almost four decades later, plaintiff Amstar Corporation found its
proffered survey results rejected, due in large part to the same flaw
identified in the Procter & Gamble survey. In Amstar Corp. v. Dom-
80 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir.
1984) (survey which included "obviously leading question" properly excluded); Anti-
Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983) (surveys offered by both parties to trademark action re-
jected because questions asked were irrelevant to dispositive legal issues); Exxon Corp.
v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1980) (format of questions critical to the
weight accorded a survey); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d
161, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957) (trial court's exclusion of survey
results based on "self-serving" questions upheld). But cf Carlock v. State, 609 S.W.2d
787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (polling data not rendered inadmissible simply because
more probative questions could have been asked; deficiencies in question drafting goes
to weight, not admissibility).
An interesting approach was taken in the obscenity prosecution case of State v.
Mayes, 86 N.C. App. 569, 359 S.E.2d 30 (1987), aff'd, 323 N.C. 159, 371 S.E.2d 476
(1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1009 (1989), where the court allowed a defense expert to
testify based on results of two of seven questions the witness prepared for a survey,
holding that the other five questions had "absolutely no relevance to what the commu-
nity considers obscene." Id. at 577, 359 S.E.2d at 36.
81 137 F.2d 365, 367-68 (C.C.P.A. 1943).
82 Id.
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ino's Pizza, Inc. ," Amstar offered survey results to establish a like-
lihood of confusion between its product, Domino sugar, and the
origin of the defendant's product, Domino's pizza. The results were
obtained by showing each respondent a Domino's Pizza box and
asking if respondent believed that the company which made the
pizza made any other product. If the response was yes, respondent
was then asked, "What products other than pizza do you think are
made by the company that makes Domino's Pizza?" 84 Over sev-
enty percent of the persons asked this question responded,
"Sugar."'8 5 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's refusal to
accord any probative weight to the survey, holding that the form
and order of the survey questions reduced the process to "a mere
word association test entitled to little weight."
8 6
Even when no deliberate effort is made to lead the respondents,
the task of drafting survey questions which will yield unbiased and
accurate results is not an easy one. While it is tempting to think
that straightforward answers to survey questions can be evoked by
simple, straightforward questions, this is not always the case.87 As
one expert observed, each questionnaire constructor and each re-
spondent brings his or her particular (and often highly unusual)
meanings and nuances to the process.8 8 The difficulties occasioned
by semantic variables are lessened by using words with which re-
spondents are familiar, phrasing questions in a conversational, non-
threatening manner, and by avoiding leading questions. 89 Pilot test-
ing of individual questions and the completed questionnaire is
highly recommended by polling experts.'
83 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980).
9Id. at 263.
851d.
8 6 1d. at 264 (citation omitted).
87 B. HENNESSY, supra note 4, at 104. As one social scientist explains this problem,
"[l]anguage is the conduit of social measurement. Although the language of the survey
questions can be standardized, there is no guarantee that the meaning assigned to the
questions is consistent over respondents." R. GROVES, supra note 6, at 450.
88 R. GROVES, supra note 6, at 450.
89 B. HENNESSY, supra note 4, at 107-09. See generally R. GROVES, supra note 6, at
449-82; H. SCHUMAN, supra note 9; S. SUDMAN & N. BRADBURN, supra note 61.
90 S. SUDMAN & N. BRADBURN, supra note 61, at 282-85; B. HENNESSY, supra note
4, at 11; A. BLANKENSHIP, supra note 6, at 82. As Blankenship observes,
[H]umans are dynamic rather than static. Because of this fact, no question-
naire, regardless of how carefully it is planned, may be assumed to work well
until tested under field conditions. A limited number of trial interviews may
provide rough checks upon the quality of the wording of the questions, their
scope and sequence, the length of the questionnaire, instructions to field work-
ers, plans for tabulation, and the final cost of the survey.
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In light of the difficulties engaged in question formulation, a liti-
gant offering survey results into evidence is virtually assured that
the opposing party, an expert retained by that party, or the court
itself will scrutinize the survey questions for intended as well as in-
advertent bias and potentially fatal semantic flaws.
For example, in American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear
Co. ,9 the issue was whether defendant's marketing of a "bionic
boot" violated certain trademark, unfair competition, and related
laws. The trial court excluded from evidence the results of a tele-
phone survey conducted of a "national probability" sample consist-
ing of over 800 respondents.92 The party which proffered the
survey, intervenor Universal Studios, claimed that the results estab-
lished that the term "bionic" carried a secondary meaning due to its
association with Universal's "The Six Million Dollar Man" and
"The Bionic Woman" television shows.93 The appellate court af-
firmed the exclusion of the survey results, primarily because of per-
ceived flaws in the question posed to the respondents: "With whom
or what do you associate a product labelled Bionic?" The court
deemed the question too self-serving,94 noting that the more rele-
vant question would have been, "[W]ith whom or what do you asso-
ciate a 'Bionic' boot?" 95
In addition to potential difficulties in the phrasing of questions,
litigants face the possibility that a court will view a survey as having
asked the wrong question; that is, one which yields results which
are irrelevant to the key issues in the litigation. Such was the case
in People v. Norwood,96 where the court concluded that survey re-
sults establishing that most people residing in the challenged venue
had heard of a murder charge were irrelevant to whether respon-
dents were prejudiced against the defendant such that a trial within
their jurisdiction would violate defendant's right to a fair and im-
partial jury.
2. The Pittsburgh Press Club Criteria
In 1960, the Judicial Conference Study Group articulated several
factors by which the trustworthiness of a particular poll could be
Id. at 82.
91 609 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1979).
92 Id. at 661 n.4.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 37 Colo. App. 157, 547 P.2d 273 (1975).
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adjudged.9 7 Almost two decades later, the Third Circuit elaborated
on these factors in Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States.9 Since
that time, a number of jurisdictions99 have utilized the Pittsburgh
Press Club criteria, in whole or in part, as a means of testing the
proffered survey data for "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness." °  These standards, which closely parallel the various steps
of the survey process, dictate that:
(1) A proper universe of respondents must be examined and a
representative sample chosen;
(2) The persons conducting the surveys must be experts;
(3) The data must be properly gathered and accurately
reported;
(4) The questionnaires and manner of interviewing must meet
the standards of objective surveying and statistical techniques;
(5) The survey must be conducted independently of the attor-
neys involved in the litigation;
(6) The interviewers or sample designers should be trained
and "ideally" should be unaware of the purpose of the survey
and litigation which inspire it; and
(7) The respondents should be unaware of the purposes of the
survey. 101
In addition, the Pittsburgh Press Club opinion suggests that the sur-
vey must be material, and more probative than any other evidence
on the issue to be admissible."0 2
As previously noted, failure to meet any one of the Pittsburgh
Press Club standards can be fatal to the admissibility or probative
value of poll results; however, courts often view selection of the uni-
verse and formulation and content of the questionnaire as largely
determinative of the trustworthiness of the evidence."0 3 Focusing
97See Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25
F.R.D. 351, 429 (1960).
98 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978).
99 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 522 (10th Cir. 1987);
Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Local 560, 780 F.2d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140
(1986); Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 552 (7th Cir. 1980); American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1062, 1070 (D.N.J.), aff'd,
834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987); Saliba v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1181, 1188 (Ind. App.), petition
for transfer denied, 484 N.E.2d 1295 (1985); Liberty Fin. Mgmt. Corp. v. Beneficial
Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40, 54-55 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
100 Pittsburgh Press Club, 579 F.2d at 758.
101 Id.
IO2 Id.
103 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir.
1984) (trial court erred in admitting survey of improper universe based on "obvious
leading questions"); Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch., 628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir.
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on these two factors makes common sense and is technically astute,
because asking the wrong people or the wrong question renders the
responses irrelevant as a matter of law.
3. The Manual for Complex Litigation
With several important exceptions,t 4 the two most recent edi-
tions of the Federal Judicial Center's Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion, published in 1981 and 1985,10' are generally in accord with the
Pittsburgh Press Club criteria.'" The 1981 Manual suggests that
the proponent of survey data has the burden of establishing that the
poll was conducted in accordance with accepted principles of sur-
vey research.' 7 This burden can be met by establishing that:
(1) A proper universe was examined;
(2) A representative sample was drawn from that universe;
(3) The mode of questioning the interviewers was correct;
(4) The persons conducting the survey were recognized
experts;
(5) The data gathered was accurately reported; and
(6) The sample design, the questionnaire, and the interviewing
were in accord with generally accepted standards of procedure
1980) (formation of questions and adequacy of universe are critical determinations);
Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 264 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[O]ne of the
most important factors in assessing the validity of an opinion poll is the adequacy of the
,survey universe'...."); Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Laboratories,
532 F. Supp. 1040, 1058 (D.N.J. 1980) ("most serious defect" in survey deemed inad-
missible by trial court was lack of effort demonstrated by pollster to insure representa-
tiveness of interviewees); Commonwealth v. Trainor, 374 Mass. 796, 806, 374 N.E.2d
1216, 1220, 1222 (1978) (survey offered to establish community standards in obscenity
case excluded due to reliance on local rather than state-wide universe and irrelevancy of
results due to improper questions).
104 These exceptions are: the role of the attorney in the survey process, the require-
ment that a party disclose his intent to conduct a poll to his opponent and to the court
prior to the survey's execution, and the suggestion that surveys that record objective
and subjective data should be reviewed under different standards of scrutiny.
105 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (5th ed. 1981) [hereinafter 1981 MANUAL];
1985 MANUAL, supra note 48.
106 The 1960 Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Liti-
gation was superseded by editions of the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION pub-
lished under the auspices of the Federal Judicial Center in 1970 (2d ed.), 1973 (3d ed.),
1977 (4th ed.), 1981 (5th ed.) and 1985 (MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND).
The 1985 edition is labeled "Second" because it represents a major revision in both form
and substance of previous manuals. For example, the 1981 MANUAL devotes six full
pages to polling and survey data, see 1981 MANUAL at 112-17, while the 1985 MANUAL
covers the subject in four paragraphs. See 1985 MANUAL, supra note 48, § 21.484, at
88-89.
107 1981 MANUAL, supra note 105, at 120.
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and statistics.10 '
The 1981 Manual also encourages the court to require proponents
of survey evidence to "divulge the raw data, the method and pro-
gram employed in evaluating the data, and all the results derived,
both favorable and unfavorable to the offering party."' 9
The most recent edition of the Manual, published in 1985,1
deletes, without explanation, the six-point checklist set forth above.
It offers instead the terse recommendation that "[t]he proponent of
such evidence has the burden of establishing conformity with gener-
ally recognized statistical standards, a task that will ordinarily in-
volve expert testimony.""' The 1985 Manual also differs from its
immediate predecessor, and from the Pittsburgh Press Club stan-
dards, by advocating mandatory disclosure of a litigant's intent to
take a poll prior to execution." 2
Courts which embrace the recommendations set forth in the 1981
or 1985 Manuals generally focus on the same primary issues of uni-
verse selection and questionnaire formulation which are emphasized
in Pittsburgh Press Club and its progeny. As noted previously,
however, the Manual differs in several important respects. First,
unlike the Pittsburgh Press Club standards, the 1981 and 1985 edi-
tions of the Manual do not identify attorney involvement in the
survey process as being inherently suspect. Second, as explained
above, the 1985 Manual strongly recommends that a party disclose
its intent to conduct a survey prior to execution, and work with the
court and opposing counsel to produce an acceptable survey." 3 Fi-
nally, the 1981 Manual expressly articulates, and the 1985 Manual
more subtly suggests, a distinction unheeded in decisional law, to
wit, a perceived difference between surveys which record objective
facts and those which report subjective impressions." 4 Each of
168Id. The standards delineated in the 1981 MANUAL have not enjoyed the same
level of acceptance as the Pittsburgh Press Club decision, but have influenced a number
of courts. See, e.g., National Football League Properties, Inc. v. N. J. Giants, Inc., 637
F. Supp. 507, 513-14 (D.N.J. 1986). Some courts have relied upon both the Pittsburgh
Press Club decision and the 1981 MANUAL for guidance. See, e.g., Boehringer In-
gelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Laboratories, 532 F. Supp. 1040, 1057-58 (D.N.J.
1980).
109 1981 MANUAL, supra note 105, § 3.50. A discussion of discovery issues peculiar
to polling data is outside the scope of this Article.
110 1985 MANUAL, supra note 48.
111 Id. § 21.484.
112 1d.
113 Id.
114Id.
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these differences is discussed in Section II of this Article.
4. Federal Rules of Evidence Approach
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides a vehicle for an expert to
offer an opinion even where the data or information underlying the
opinion is not within her personal knowledge. The rule states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need
not be admissible in evidence. 
15
The advisory committee notes to Rule 703 explain that the facts
or data upon which expert opinions are predicated may be derived
from three sources: (1) first-hand observation of the witness (for
example, a treating physician); (2) cases presented at trial (for ex-
ample, the hypothetical question posed to an expert); and (3) data
presented to the expert which was formulated outside the trial and
was not of the expert's own observation." 6 The third category,
which has resulted in much controversy, governs the use of polling
evidence where the testifying witness did not conduct the poll, but
did rely in whole or in part on the poll's results to form an expert
opinion. The advisory committee defended the reliance by an ex-
pert upon data not directly gathered by the witness:
In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert
opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring
the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts
themselves when not in court. Thus a physician in his own prac-
tice bases his diagnosis on information from numerous sources
and of considerable variety, including statements by patients and
relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other
doctors, hospital records, and X rays. Most of them are admissi-
ble in evidence, but only with the expenditure of substantial time
in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses.
The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon
them. His validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-
examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes.
The rule also offers a more satisfactory basis for ruling upon
the admissibility of public opinion poll evidence. Attention is di-
rected to the validity of the techniques employed rather than to
relatively fruitless inquiries whether hearsay is involved."
17
115 FED. R. EvID. 703.
116 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
117 Id. (citations omitted); see also 1985 MANUAL, supra note 48, § 2.712.
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Despite the liberal application advocated in the advisory commit-
tee notes, Rule 703 does not provide carte blanche for experts to
rely on any data whatsoever, including that derived from public
opinion polls. Rather, Rule 703 expressly requires that the materi-
als on which an expert bases her opinion must be "of a type reason-
ably relied upon by experts in the particular field." If this threshold
showing is made, then-and only then-"the facts or data [underly-
ing the expert's opinion] need not be admissible in evidence." 1 18
Although the advisory committee notes suggest Rule 703 as a
means to streamline the admissibility of survey evidence by circum-
venting the hearsay problem associated with public opinion polls,
Rule 703 raises more issues than it resolves.
First, Rule 703 implicitly creates an important evidentiary di-
chotomy: reliance by an expert on polling results (or any other
data) to form her opinion does not automatically render the results
admissible as substantive evidence." 9 At best, Rule 703 paves the
way for admission of the expert's opinion as substantive evidence,
regardless of the admissibility per se of the underlying data. 20
Second, courts often read Rule 703 to require a showing that the
data on which the expert relied is otherwise admissible. 2' As ap-
plied to polling evidence, this means that courts will continue to
wrestle with hearsay challenges to the admissibility of polling
results.
Finally, Rule 703 appears to be inapplicable when the expert of-
fering an opinion is the pollster himself, rather than an expert rely-
ing on the litigant-commissioned poll as only one piece of data upon
which to form her opinion.' 22 These limitations of Rule 703 are
discussed further in Section II. B. of this Article.
118 FED. R. EVID. 703.
119 FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
120See Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1984).
121 See Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 739 F.2d 1028, 1033
(5th Cir. 1984); Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 1984);
United States v. Cox, 696 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 827 (1983).
122 See Paddack, 745 F.2d at 1261-62.
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II
CONFUSING AND CONFLICTING STANDARDS
ON KEY ISSUES
A. Relying upon the "Weight Versus Admissibility" Principle:
Some Curious Results
Where a court finds technical deficiencies in the methodology of a
survey which prevents it from satisfying any of the previously dis-
cussed standards in toto, such flaws are not per se grounds for ex-
clusion of the survey results into evidence. Rather, a general rule
has emerged that such deficiencies impact the weight accorded to
survey results rather than barring admissibility.'
23
This is not to say, however, that technical flaws are never cited or
upheld as a reason for excluding survey data from evidence. In
United States v. Local 560, 2' for example, the court recited the gen-
eral rule that technical problems normally impact only the weight
to be attached to the survey evidence. Nonetheless, the Third Cir-
cuit held that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a
survey, in which only fifteen members of a union had been polled, to
establish the membership's perception of the reputation of past and
present members of the union's executive board.
25
In reviewing the rare cases in which surveys were not admitted
because of technical shortcomings, at least three observations are
readily made. First, the flaws are usually substantial, that is, of suf-
ficient magnitude to render the results inherently untrustworthy
123 See Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 844 (1 1th Cir.
1983); C. A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1055 n.10
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981); Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510, 521 (10th Cir. 1976).
124 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
125 Local 560, 780 F.2d at 276-77. The Second Circuit reached a similar result when
it viewed a survey as utilizing an improper universe and posing an "obvious leading
question." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir.
1984); see also Bank of Utah v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 369 F.2d 19, 27 (10th Cir. 1966)
(survey properly excluded by trial court due to reliance on improper universe), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967); Hawley Prods. Co. v. United States Trunk Co., 259 F.2d
69, 77 (1st Cir. 1958) (same); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States Life Ins. Co., 246 F.2d
161, 171 (5th Cir.) (trial court's exclusion of survey containing "self-serving" questions
upheld), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957); Delgado v. McTighe, 91 F.R.D. 76, 80-81
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (survey held inadmissible where expert could not testify with certainty
that responses were representative of the universe and where terms used were not de-
fined); Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v. Pharmadyne Laboratories, 532 F. Supp. 1040,
1057-58 (D.N.J. 1980) (survey evidence rejected due to attorneys' involvement in ques-
tion design and due to "serious defect" in universe selection).
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and even irrelevant as a matter of law.'2 6 Second, the vast majority
of cases in which polling evidence was rejected were decided when
survey techniques had not evolved to the level of sophistication and
popularity they enjoy today.'27 Finally, the wide discretion gener-
ally accorded trial judges in deciding evidentiary matters is not con-
stricted when survey evidence is at issue.' 28 Thus, the trial court's
exclusion or assignment of probative value to a seriously flawed sur-
vey will seldom be reversed on appeal.
The shift in focus from a question of admissibility to one of
weight accorded survey evidence has led to some highly questiona-
ble-if not absurd--evidentiary rulings. In the trademark infringe-
ment case of American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc. ,129
for example, the court found plaintiff's survey seriously flawed in
many respects: it was designed by counsel, its questions were bi-
ased, it was performed in a haphazard and unprofessional manner,
and the respondents were not randomly selected.' 3 ° Despite these
findings, the court accorded the survey "some limited weight,"13'
noting that technical adequacy is a matter of weight rather than
admissibility,"3 2 and that the survey results "corroborated the
court's own finding" on the key issue of the likelihood of confusion
between the products at issue.'
33
Measured against any standard of trustworthiness, the survey re-
sults should have been excluded from consideration by the Ameri-
126 Such was the case in Local 560, 780 F.2d at 277, where only fifteen union mem-
bers, whose bias against union leadership was already known, were polled as "represent-
atives" of the entire union membership, as well as in Universal City Studios, 746 F.2d at
118, where the key question posed to respondents suggested its own answer.
127 The mere fact that the advisory committee's note in FED. R. EVID. 703, adopted
in 1975, recommends that rule as a "more satisfactory" method of admitting polling
evidence, suggests that this type of evidence had gained widespread acceptance.
128 See Local 560, 780 F.2d at 279; Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405, 1413
(11 th Cir. 1984); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 385 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
129 619 F. Supp. 1204 (D.N.J. 1985), vacated in part on other grounds, 807 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir. 1986).
130 American Greetings, 619 F. Supp. at 1224.
131 Id. A similar result occurred in Union Carbide, 531 F.2d at 388, where the appel-
late court held that a survey excluded by the trial court due to bias should have been
considered probative of the likelihood of confusion. In a classic "horse before the cart"
maneuver, the court held that the extremely high percentage of confusion demonstrated
by the survey overcame the bias problem. Id. This logic is flawed since the bias may
well have driven the high results.
132 American Greetings, 619 F. Supp. at 1224 (citing United States v. 88 Cases, More
or Less, Containing Bireley's Orange Beverage, 187 F.2d 967, 974 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951)).
133Id.
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can Greetings court. Indeed, the court's threshold findings that an
improper universe was selected and that the questions were biased,
effectively rendered the results irrelevant to the specific issues before
the court. In short, the American Greetings decision rode rough-
shod over the most basic principle of evidence, to wit, that only
relevant material demonstrating some degree of trustworthiness is
admissible. 34 Such treatment can be explained by either of two
theories: (1) the court misunderstood the evidentiary standards
governing polls, or (2) the court credited the results because they
were in accord with the court's desired outcome.
1 35
Further support for the "outcome-oriented" theory is found
where a court ignores survey results which it finds technically sound
but which do not support the court's ultimate conclusion. This was
the situation in the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Meese v. Keene. 36
In Meese, a California State Senator desired to exhibit three Ca-
nadian films on acid rain and nuclear war which the Department of
Justice had previously identified as fitting the definition of "political
propaganda" found in the Foreign Agents Registration Act of
1938.137 Senator Meese challenged the Act on first amendment
grounds, claiming that due to the pejorative nature of the term
"political propaganda" (defined in the Act to include any communi-
cations used to influence U.S. foreign policy), 13 exhibiting films
134 Similar abuse of certain fundamental rules of evidence arguably occurred in
Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (8th Cir. 1980), where the court did
not dispute defendant's claim of multiple errors in plaintiff's survey, including a com-
plaint that no expert had been offered to lay a foundation for admission of the evidence,
but held that such "technical deficiencies" go to the weight accorded the survey rather
than its admissibility.
135 Another example of an outcome-oriented result is General Motors Corp. v. Cadil-
lac Marine & Boat Co., 226 F. Supp. 716, 735-38 (W.D. Mich. 1964), where one court
admitted a survey into evidence which supported its resolution of the case even though
the court recognized that the survey's probative value fell "far short" of acceptable
standards, due to selection of an improper universe, improper phrasing and ordering of
questions, inaccurate and misleading tabulations of the responses, and complete lack of
testimony as to how the survey was prepared.
136481 U.S. 465 (1987).
137 By letter dated January 13, 1983, the Department of Justice notified the National
Film Board of Canada (NFBC) that the three films-"If You Love This Planet," "Acid
Rain: Requeim or Recovery," and "Acid From Heaven"-were considered "political
propaganda" pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21
(1966), and "requested that NFBC comply with the labeling and reporting requirements
imposed by § 4 of the Act, 22 U.S.C. § 614." See Meese, 481 U.S. at 467-68 nn. I & 3.
13 8 Meese, 481 U.S. at 471-72.
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characterized as such would harm his political career. 139
In arguing his case, the Senator submitted a Gallup pollster's affi-
davit wherein the pollster explained the results of a survey showing
that 49.1% of the public would be less inclined to vote for a candi-
date who had "arranged to show to the public three foreign films
which the Justice Dept. had classified as 'political propaganda.' ,,4
The district court observed that the survey evidence was "neither
rebutted [n]or impeached" and found the results conclusive: the
term "political propaganda," as used in the context of the statute,
was derogatory and created an impermissible chilling effect which
abridged free speech.1 4' The Supreme Court disagreed.
Though the Court identified no technical flaws or other eviden-
tiary barricades impacting the weight or admissibility of the "un-
contradicted"' 42 survey evidence, it considered the survey results
probative and conclusive only on the issue of whether the Senator
had standing to bring the lawsuit.' 43 In fact, the Court cited the
poll as compelling the conclusion that the term "political propa-
ganda" clearly "threatens to cause him cognizable injury."'" But
instead of relying on the uncontested survey results which demon-
strated that nearly half of the population perceived the word "prop-
aganda" negatively, the Court took refuge in the Webster's
Dictionary definition of "propaganda"' 14 to support its conclusion
that the word is amenable to several interpretations which are not
all pejorative in nature. The Court also gratuitously deemed the
pejorative definition the "narrower" one.' 1" As used in the statute,
the Court opined, "propaganda" carries a neutral meaning 147 which
does not place the regulated material "beyond the pale of legitimate
discourse."' 48 Accordingly, the Court found no constitutional infir-
mities in the statute.
149
The Court's treatment of the survey results in Meese is inconsis-
139 Id. at 473.
140 Id. at 473-74 n.7.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 474.
143 Id. at 473-76.
144 Id. at 473.
145 Id. at 477-78 n. 10. The Court quoted WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1817 (3d ed. 1981), defining "propaganda" as "doctrines, ideas, argument,
facts or allegations spread by deliberate effort through any medium of communication
in order to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause." Id.
1
4 6 Meese, 481 U.S. at 478.
147 Id.
148 1d. at 479.
149 Id. at 484-85.
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tent at best and intellectually dishonest at worst. First, the Court
found the uncontested survey results--specifically, the showing that
almost 50% of the public would be less inclined to vote for an indi-
vidual who had shown a film labeled by the government as propa-
ganda-sufficient evidence of potential harm to allow the Senator to
establish standing and pursue his first amendment challenge to the
statute. In virtually the next breath, however, the Court rejected
the Senator's argument that, since many voters perceive the term
propaganda in a pejorative sense, the use of the word in the statute
seriously restricted his first amendment right to show any films fit-
ting the statutory description. Instead, the Court relied upon the
dictionary definition to support its conclusion that propaganda is
not always a pejorative term. But it is the public, not dictionaries,
who vote. The Court's simultaneous reliance upon and rejection of
the survey results is neither intellectually satisfying nor reality-
based. 1
50
The probative value assigned to any piece of evidence is, and
should remain, a matter of discretion with the court. What cases
such as American Greetings and Meese illustrate, however, is discre-
tion gone awry. Such misdirection is perhaps traceable directly to
the unique nature and historic treatment of survey evidence.
While a cynic may argue that the treatment accorded survey evi-
dence by these two courts is reconcilable because both courts were
outcome-oriented, one can just as plausibly view these decisions as
examples of continued misunderstanding of the proper role of sur-
vey evidence. That is, in American Greetings, the court embraced
the "weight versus admissibility" principle without question, and in
the process overrode additional, dispositive considerations such as
relevance and trustworthiness; in Meese, the Court was reluctant to
declare a federal statute constitutionally infirm on the strength of a
type of evidence which historically has been considered suspect.
Trademark, antitrust, and other cases which routinely involve
survey evidence are usually tried to the bench. In this situation,
another dynamic is at work which may inspire blind adherence to
the weight versus admissibility test. That dynamic is the appellate
15 0 The Court also posited that since the definition of political propaganda had been
"on the books" for over 40 years, the Court could safely presume that people "who have
a sufficient understanding of the law" know that the statutory definition of the term "is
a broad, neutral one rather than a pejorative one." Id. at 483 (footnotes omitted).
Again, the Court's logic begs a reality check: in view of the uncontested results of the
public opinion poll, how many voters can we presume possess this sophisticated com-
prehension of "the law?"
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court's "charitable presumption" that the trial court relied only
upon evidence which was properly received in reaching its deci-
sion. 151 The existence of this presumption has led at least one fed-
eral trial court to conclude that the "safer course" is to receive the
admittedly flawed evidence and then ignore it or give it as much
weight as the court deems appropriate.1 52 Adoption of such a
course by trial courts may be inspired by appellate court observa-
tions like the following from the Eighth Circuit:
In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a
trial judge to commit reversible error by receiving incompetent
evidence, whether objected to or not. An appellate court will not
reverse a judgment in a nonjury case because of the admission of
incompetent evidence, unless all of the competent evidence is in-
sufficient to support the judgment or unless it affirmatively ap-
pears that the incompetent evidence induced the court to make
an essential finding which would not otherwise have been made.
On the other hand, a trial judge who, in the trial of a nonjury
case, attempts to make strict rulings on the admissibility of evi-
dence, can easily get his decision reversed by excluding evidence
which is objected to, but which, on review, the appellate court
believes should have been admitted.
153
The charitable presumption that the trial court will assign appro-
priate weight to even highly questionable evidence is, of course,
based on the theory that judges, unlike juries, can completely ignore
evidence once it has been admitted.' 54 While such a theory is just
one of many fictions under which our system of justice operates,
there are several arguments which counsel against the wholesale
adoption of the "admit it for what it's worth" approach. Certainly,
"there is room for skepticism on the point that judges will rely only
upon what is admissible and disregard the rest."' 55 Additionally,
there is nothing in the rules of evidence, either in the generally ac-
cepted codified form or its common law precedent, which sets or
even permits application of different standards in jury and non-jury
cases. 156
In sum, mere existence of the weight versus admissibility stan-
151 See, e.g., United States v. 396 Corp., 264 F.2d 704 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 817 (1959).
152 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1202
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
153 Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950) (citations
omitted).
154 Toys "R" Us, 559 F. Supp. at 1202.
155 Id.
156 Id.
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dard does not excuse the court from determining the degree to
which flaws affect the ability of survey evidence to meet threshold
requirements, such as relevancy and inherent credibility. Even if
the survey is perfectly executed and the results properly analyzed,
all is still for naught if the wrong question or questions are posed to
the respondents. Conversely, where questionnaire design appears
beyond reproach and execution is unchallenged, even an uninten-
tional but careless error in the analysis of the results can render the
entire process suspect, so as to fall short of circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. As with all other types of evidence, an af-
firmative duty remains with the trial court to exercise its discretion
to determine whether any flaws are serious enough to warrant ex-
clusion of the evidence. Rubber-stamping admission under the
weight versus admissibility principle is simply not acceptable.
B. Discerning the Utility of Federal Rule of Evidence 703 When
Survey Results are Proffered
As noted previously, 57 three shortcomings are apparent when
Rule 703 is employed to overcome the hearsay obstacle to the ad-
mission of survey or polling data. First, Rule 703 allows for admis-
sion of an expert's opinion premised on survey or other "hearsay"
evidence, but does not provide for admission of the underlying data
as substantive evidence. Second, even when survey or other data is
being cited for the limited purpose of supporting the expert's opin-
ion, a number of courts continue to carefully scrutinize the data for
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness normally required of
substantive evidence. Finally, Rule 703 is not (or should not be)
applicable where poll or survey results constitute the entirety of the
data underlying the expert's opinion. These points are discussed
seriatim below.'
157 See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
158 In defense of the drafters of Rule 703, who envisioned that rule as a means to aid
in the admission of survey results, the interrelationship among Rules 703, 704, and 705
must be noted. Rule 704 is often helpful to the party proffering survey results through
the testimony of an expert, since it allows an opinion or inference even if it "embraces
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R. EVID. 704. Thus, in an
obscenity case, the expert could rely on survey results to testify about the community
standards against which the challenged work could be judged; in a defamation case, the
expert could rely on a public opinion poll to opine that the plaintiff is or is not a public
figure.
Rule 705 allows expert testimony "without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or
data, unless the court requires otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 705. As a practical matter,
however, the party offering the expert has usually divulged a good deal of information
about the underlying data under the liberal rules of discovery. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ.
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1. Substantive Evidence Limitation
Prior to the 1975 enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
expert opinion testimony was allowed even where the data underly-
ing the opinion was inadmissible; however, only the expert's opinion
per se was admissible as substantive evidence. This line drawing
was explained by the Tenth Circuit in Hickok v. G.D. Searle &
Co. 159 in response to plaintiff's attempt to offer rebuttal testimony
to support his medical theory of causation. The proffered testimony
consisted of his medical expert's explanation of a recently published
medical article. The court excluded the testimony on the grounds
that the article was hearsay and, in any event, could not have served
as the basis of the expert's opinion since it was published after the
opinion was formed. The court further explained:
It is true that expert witnesses are sometimes allowed to testify as
to hearsay matters by discussing published materials .... but this
is allowed in our Circuit solely to establish the basis for the ex-
pert's opinion, and not to establish the veracity of the hearsay
matters themselves. Where testimony as to hearsay is received
for such a limited purpose, its effect is to be carefully controlled
by the trial judge, including the giving of limiting instructions to
the jury. 160
The pre-Rules evidentiary dichotomy of allowing admission of
the expert's opinion into evidence but not the underlying data was
not dissolved by the adoption of Rule 703; to the contrary, Rule 703
simply states that the facts or data on which the expert's opinion is
based "need not be admissible in evidence."' 16 ' This has led courts
to conclude, as did the Hickok court in its pre-Rules decision, that
the underlying data is not admissible absent a showing of independ-
ent grounds supporting admissibility. 162 As explained by the Ninth
P. 26. Even where the underlying data has not been produced prior to trial, Rule 705
mandates disclosure of "the underlying facts or data on cross-examination." FED. R.
EvID. 705. A party's inability to produce the underlying survey data can prove fatal to
the admissibility of the survey results and/or the expert's testimony based on those
results. See, e.g., Hackett v. Housing Auth., 750 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir.) (survey
excluded because original raw data no longer available), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 850
(1985); Porter v. United States, 409 F. Supp. 757, 762 (Cust. Ct. 1976) (court deter-
mines that results of studies are not credible, inter alia, because "the data from which
the results were derived is unavailable, and cannot be examined or verified").
159 496 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1974); see also Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188,
222 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958).
16 0 Hickok, 496 F.2d at 447 (citation omitted).
161 FED. R. EvID. 703.
162 See, e.g., Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir.
1988); Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983); Rush
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Circuit, "Rule 703 merely permits such hearsay, or other inadmissi-
ble evidence, upon which an expert properly relies, to be admitted
to explain the basis of the expert's opinion. It does not allow the
admission of the [hearsay] reports to establish the truth of what
they assert."
163
Stated more succinctly, "[w]hile an expert witness may base his
opinion on such evidence, this does not magically render the hear-
say evidence admissible."' 64 Recognition of this dichotomy has
caused some courts to instruct the jury that the materials on which
the expert based her opinion are not substantive evidence which
may be considered separately from the expert's testimony. I 65 The
practical ramification of such a ruling in the context of polling evi-
dence is that the most persuasive data may not be carried into the
jury room during deliberation, and the jury may even be instructed
to accord the survey results little or no weight independent of the
expert's opinion. In a bench or jury trial, the trier of fact may find
an expert's opinion unpersuasive due to a subjective determination
of credibility. Without independent admission of the empirical pol-
ling (or other) data supporting the expert's opinion, the proponent
of the expert's testimony may well be unable to meet his burden of
proof, even where the empirical data alone is sufficient to meet that
burden.
The drafters of Rule 703 have been criticized for not addressing
or remedying this two-tiered evidentiary standard. 166 Indeed, while
the distinction between admission of the expert's opinion and the
data underlying that opinion places a cumbersome, but not neces-
Presbyterian St. Luke's Medical Center v. Safeco Ins. Co., 722 F. Supp. 485, 498 (N.D.
I1. 1989).
163 Paddack v. Dave Christensen, Inc., 745 F.2d 1254, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1984) (foot-
note omitted) (citations omitted).
164 Rose Hall, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Overseas Banking Corp., 576 F. Supp. 107,
158 (D. Del. 1983), aff'd mem., 740 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1159 (1985). See generally Carlson, Getting a Grip on Experts, LITIGATION, Summer
1990, at 36-38, 59; Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony.- Limitations on Af-
firmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234 (1984). As Carlson
points out in his 1990 LITIGATION article, Minnesota has recently amended its counter-
part to federal Rule 703 to prohibit wholesale admission of the data underlying the
expert's testimony during direct examination of the expert. See Carlson, LITIGATION at
38, 59; see also, Park, Confining the Expert: Rule 703(b) of the Rules of Evidence,
BENCH & BAR OF MINNESOTA 33 (March 1990).
165 Paddack, 745 F.2d at 1262.
166 See, e.g., American Bar Association, Emerging Problems Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence 209 (1983) ("Once an expert gives an opinion based upon inadmissible hear-
say, the question whether the jury should be provided with the otherwise inadmissible
information often arises. Rule 703 does not address this problem, nor does Rule 705.").
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sarily insurmountable, burden on the litigants, it may also confuse
the jury. Fortunately, expert opinion testimony on crucial points is
liberally allowed to aid the jury, and admission of any or all of the
data underlying that opinion is available pursuant to evidentiary
rules other than Rule 703. In the specific context of polls and
surveys, admission can be sought, as previously discussed, 16 7 under
the present sense impression, state of mind, business record, or
residual exceptions to the hearsay rule. To eliminate, or at least
lessen, the potential for jury confusion, a simple limiting instruction
regarding the data underlying the expert's opinion can be given.
168
The gravamen of the problem with Rule 703 is that neither the
explicit language of the rule nor the accompanying advisory notes
direct the courts and litigants to these possibilities; rather, the notes
suggest that Rule 703 alone provides sufficient grounds for admis-
sion of the survey data over a hearsay objection. In short, Rule 703
does not live up to the advisory note's billing as "a more satisfactory
basis for ruling upon the admissibility of public opinion poll
evidence."169
2. Judicial Scrutiny of Data Underlying the Expert's Opinion
In addition to not providing a vehicle for the admission of polling
results as substantive evidence, Rule 703 also presents a potential
obstacle to getting survey results in front of the jury, even in the
form of an expert's opinion. This is because some courts examine
the data underlying the expert's opinion not only to determine
whether an expert in the field could properly rely upon it, but also
to independently assess the data's reliability. Under this restrictive
view, the expert is not allowed to testify if the foundation materials
would have been excluded as hearsay, regardless of whether the
"hearsay" material is of a type which the expert routinely consults
in his usual field of endeavor. 7° The irony is thus repeated: while
Rule 703 was intended to circumvent the hearsay objection to sur-
vey evidence, 171 some courts still require a showing that survey evi-
167 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
168Paddack, 745 F.2d at 1263; United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114, 1118 n.4
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 843 (1982).
169 FED. R. EvID. 703 advisory committee's note.
170 See generally 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 703[03]
(1991). While not specifically citing Rule 703, the Pittsburgh Press Club court excluded
the exhibits and expert testimony which were based on the survey data which had failed
to meet the court's criteria for trustworthiness. See Pittsburgh Press Club v. United
States, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978).
171 See FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
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dence comes within an exception to the hearsay rule even before
allowing an expert to offer an opinion based in whole or in part on
survey results.
A case illustrating the courts' continued confusion over the role
of Rule 703 is Debra P. v. Turlington.172 In that matter, high
school students challenged the constitutionality of a requirement
that all seniors pass a competency test prior to receiving a high
school diploma. To defend the instructional validity of the test, de-
fendants commissioned a private consulting firm to conduct a study
consisting of the following four components: (1) a questionnaire
sent to teachers to ask whether they provided instruction related to
the twenty-four skills tested and, if so, whether they had provided
sufficient instruction for students to master each skill; (2) a survey
sent to sixty-seven school districts and four university laboratory
schools inquiring as to which grade levels provided instruction on
each of the skills and when the majority of students would have
mastered them; (3) site visits to verify the accuracy of the responses
provided by the districts; and (4) student surveys administered by
site visitors containing example questions in all twenty-four skill
areas. 1
73
At trial, the Debra P. defendants offered four expert witnesses
who opined, based in part upon the results of the four-part study,
that Florida schools were teaching the skills necessary for students
to pass the high school test. The plaintiffs argued that the survey
results were inadmissible hearsay and offered two experts, one of
whom testified that the teacher survey was flawed because it was
designed to illicit positive results. 
1 74
In response to plaintiffs' argument that defendants' survey results
were inadmissible hearsay, the trial court found the results admissi-
ble under the residual hearsay exception of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(24), or as the basis of expert opinion testimony under
Rule 703.175
In ruling upon the hearsay objection, the trial court conceded
that defendants' survey, like the one rejected by the court in Pitts-
burgh Press Club, was flawed because the interviewers were aware
of the purpose of the poll, but added:
[E]ven if the survey results were not admissible under Rule
172 564 F. Supp. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1983), aff'd, 730 F.2d 1405 (1lth Cir. 1984).
173Debra P, 564 F. Supp. at 180-81.
17 4 Id. at 182.
17SId.
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803(24), this Court has wide discretion under Rule 703 to allow
an expert to explain the basis of his opinion. Since all of defend-
ants' experts testified that they had relied on the survey data, and
the plaintiffs were given a substantial opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the experts on the study's reliability and to present their
own expert opinions of the data, admission of the raw data was
not prejudicial to the plaintiffs.
176
While there is certainly nothing improper in admitting polling or
other evidence on alternative grounds, the court's lengthy analysis
of the survey's admissibility in Debra P. is troubling for several rea-
sons. First, the court apparently viewed Rule 703 as an independ-
ent basis for admitting the data underlying the experts' opinions as
substantive evidence, 77 an approach which has been rejected by a
sound majority of legal authority."18 Second, after reiterating Rule
703 as the basis for admitting the evidence, the court nonetheless
independently considered plaintiffs' criticisms of the surveys to de-
termine "what weight, if any, should be given to the survey re-
sults.' 79 In short, Debra P. shows that courts continue to be mired
in the hearsay quandary, despite the intent of the drafters of Rule
703 to eliminate this evidentiary quicksand.18
0
176 Id. at 182-83 n.7 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
177 See id. at 182 ("In the alternative, they were admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 703 as
being the basis of the expert opinions presented at trial.") (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
178 See, e.g., Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir.
1988); Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987); Mannino v. Inter-
national Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1981). See generally Note, The Scope of
the Reasonable Reliance Requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1069.
179 Debra P., 564 F. Supp. at 183 n.7.
180 A rare decision illustrating the proper relationship between Rule 703 and the use
of survey evidence is Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1980). The
plaintiffs' expert, a geologist, testified that defendant's blasting operations had damaged
the walls and foundations of plaintiffs' home. His testimony was based in part upon a
survey he had conducted of homeowners in the area. The trial court incorrectly admit-
ted the survey as substantive evidence.
On appeal, defendant noted several flaws in the survey which arguably supported its
exclusion as substantive evidence. Although the appellate court did not disagree with
the defendant's assessment of the survey as hearsay which may have not been indepen-
dently admissible, the court held that the expert was entitled, under Rule 703, "to rely
on hearsay evidence to support his opinion, so long as that evidence was of a type
reasonably relied upon by other experts in the field." Id. at 553. In the court's view,
the expert's uncontradicted and unrebutted testimony that his survey was similar to
those conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission "more than satisfied the threshold
inquiry as to whether other experts would rely upon it." Id. In other words, while the
hearsay nature of the survey might bar its admission as substantive evidence, the ex-
pert's opinion based on the survey was by itself sufficient to meet plaintiff's burden of
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3. Inapplicability when Pollster is an Expert
As a vehicle for admitting survey evidence, Rule 703 is limited to
situations where an expert's proffered testimony is based only in
part on survey results. Such was the case in Debra P., where the
expert opinion testimony of a former superintendent (that the com-
petency test in question was instructionally valid) was based on his
years of work experience and professional training, as well as the
surveys conducted for the litigation. In such a scenario, the stan-
dard interpretation of Rule 703 as allowing the court to defer to the
expert's reliance on the poll appears sound.
The same deference is not appropriate, however, where the prof-
fered expert's opinions or conclusions are drawn solely from the re-
sults of a public opinion poll or survey. This latter scenario arises
frequently in litigation where the poll is designed to address a criti-
cal, if not determinative, point in the litigation, such as the degree of
consumer confusion between two products at issue in a trademark
or unfair competition case. In this context, the pollster is often the
only person offered as an expert.1"' Obviously, simply posing the
usual Rule 703 inquiry of whether the underlying material is of the
type reasonably relied upon by other experts in the same field will
always yield an affirmative answer when the pollster is the expert.
But, in such a situation, the usual presumption of credibility that
would otherwise arise due to the expert's reliance on the data
should not come into play. The inability of Rule 703 to provide
guidance in such cases is documented in a trademark infringement
action brought by the owners of Toys "R" Us against a new enter-
prise operating under the name "Kids 'r' Us.'
182
The plaintiff in Toys "R" Us sought to introduce the expert opin-
ion of its pollster, Dr. Robert C. Sorenson, that a likelihood of con-
fusion existed in the minds of the public between the names of
plaintiff's and defendant's stores.' 83 Dr. Sorenson's testimony that
proof. Accordingly, no reversible error was found in the trial court's incorrect admis-
sion of the survey as substantive evidence. Id.
181 See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 481 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 61 (1989); Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Stein-
way & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341 n.19 (2d Cir. 1975). But cf Squirtco v. Seven-Up Co.,
628 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 n.4 (8th Cir. 1980) (court holds that plaintiff's failure to pro-
vide expert to interpret survey results is not fatal to admissibility of the survey).
182 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.N.Y.
1983).
18 3 Id. at 1202.
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the public was confused by the similarity in store names was predi-
cated entirely on a survey conducted under his direction.
Although the court had no difficulty in qualifying Dr. Sorenson
as an expert,I 4 it found that the survey itself did not meet the crite-
ria for trustworthiness articulated in the 1981 Manual for Complex
Litigation. ' Specifically, the court found a high potential for error
in the methods in which the interviews were conducted and the way
in which the results were tabulated.1
8 6
Following the court's initial ruling that the survey did not reflect
sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, plaintiff attempted to salvage
the survey by calling another expert, a professor of marketing and
chairman of the marketing department at New York University.
Like Dr. Sorenson, plaintiff's second expert, Dr. Henry Assael, tes-
tified that the survey indicated consumer confusion. A number of
concessions made by Dr. Assael, however, confirmed problems in
the universe selection and the method of interviewing used in the
survey.'8 7 In short, Dr. Assael's testimony created an even wider
credibility gap in the survey evidence. Having branded the survey
as falling far short of "genuine guarantees of trustworthiness,"'1
88
the court excluded the testimony of Doctors Sorenson and Assael,
stating that no deference was due them under Rule 703.' 9
As in Debra P., the correctness of the Toys "R " Us court's exclu-
sion of the survey evidence and expert's testimony based thereon is
not necessarily suspect; in fact, an opposite ruling accepting the sur-
vey data because the expert (i.e. pollster) relied on it would repre-
sent the worst type of impermissible bootstrapping. But the case
184Id. at 1203.
185 Id. at 1205 (citing 1981 MANUAL, supra note 105, at 116).
186 The court was especially troubled by the fact that more than 20 persons employed
by Dr. Sorenson's company and two subcontracting companies were involved in the
survey's execution and the analysis of the results, that Dr. Sorenson admitted that the
validity of the survey results could have been compromised by the failure of one or more
persons to follow instructions and/or do their assigned tasks competently, and that Dr.
Sorenson could not testify based on personal knowledge as to the accuracy of the work
done by the employees of the subcontractors. Id. at 1203-04. The Toys "R" Us deci-
sion implicitly raises, but does not answer, the question as to the proper method and
person(s) needed to establish a credible foundation for the admission of the survey evi-
dence. While this issue is outside the scope of this Article, it is deserving of further
investigation by counsel commissioning a survey or poll.
1
87 Id. at 1204.
188 Id. at 1205.
189 Id. The court's rejection of the survey evidence, however, was not fatal to plain-
tiff's case. Although the survey failed in its purpose to show actual confusion, the court
found other evidence of the likelihood of confusion sufficient to grant plaintiff's request
for injunctive relief. Id. at 1210.
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serves to illustrate, once again, the failure of Rule 703 to simplify
the evidentiary issues involved when survey evidence is proffered.
Indeed, the Toys "R" Us court found it necessary to discuss at some
length the various rationales for allowing admission of "hearsay"
survey evidence before finally determining that such evidence is best
admitted under the residual hearsay exception. 1'9
In sum, the hearsay analysis continues to be replayed in many
cases where survey results are proffered, regardless of the intent of
the drafters of Rule 703 to avoid such repetition. 91 Common sense,
as well as legal authority, suggests that application of Rule 703 is
neither complex nor particularly helpful in the context of admissi-
bility of survey evidence. In the event that Rule 703 is relied upon,
the following steps are appropriate: (1) pretrial disclosure of the un-
derlying survey data and an opportunity for opposing counsel to
depose the testifying witness about same; (2) determination, prefera-
bly before trial pursuant to a motion in limine, whether the underly-
ing survey data is of a type reasonably relied upon by other experts
in the field, with appropriate deference being given to the testifying
expert's representations on this point; (3) if the question asked at
step two is answered in the affirmative, allow the witness to testify
regarding her opinion; (4) allowance for liberal inquiry on cross-
examination regarding the source(s) and validity of the underlying
survey or polling data; and (5) submission of the case to the jury
with instructions that the credibility of all witnesses, including ex-
perts, is for its determination, and that the validity (or lack thereof)
of the survey data is one factor which jury members should consider
in assessing the expert's credibility.
92
C. Requiring Disclosure of Intent to Execute a Survey
The 1960 Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of
Protracted Cases 193 recommends advance planning when survey re-
sults are to be offered into evidence. That specific recommendation
states:
190 Id. at 1204-05.
191 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
192 See United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775, 786 (11th Cir. 1989) (when expert's
opinion is based in part on hearsay, weakness of the basis of the opinion goes to weight,
not admissibility), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1300 (1990); American Universal Ins. Co. v.
Falzone, 644 F.2d 65, 66-67 (1st Cir. 1981) (court gave careful consideration to the
requirement that the expert's reliance be reasonable, but did not delve into the reliability
of reports and other "hearsay" data on which expert's opinion was based). See generally
Note, supra note 178.
193 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
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In certain instances and with the consent of all parties, it may
be desirable to consider at pre-trial a proposed poll so that the
flaws in mechanics may be eliminated, to the extent possible,
before the poll is taken. However, participation in such a proce-
dure should not be made compulsory.1 94
As previously noted, more modem standards, as articulated in
Pittsburgh Press Club and the 1985 Manual for Complex Litigation,
take divergent views regarding the duty of counsel to inform the
court and opposing party of plans to conduct a survey prior to exe-
cution. While the Third Circuit's Pittsburgh Press Club decision is
silent on this point, the 1985 Manual is unequivocal in its recom-
mendation that disclosure be mandatory:
The parties should be required, before conducting any poll, to
provide other parties with an outline of the proposed form and
methodology, including the particular questions that will be
asked, the introductory statements or instructions that will be
given, and other controls to be used in the interrogation process.
The parties should attempt to resolve any disagreements con-
cerning the manner in which the poll is to be conducted, and a
meeting between the experts engaged by the litigants may pro-
duce a mutually acceptable plan. Of course, the results and any
opinions based on the poll should be disclosed promptly after it
has been taken.
1 95
Extensive research identifies no case in which a court wholeheart-
edly embraces the 1985 Manual's recommendation and rejects sur-
vey evidence because the offering party failed to disclose its intent to
conduct the survey prior to execution. Moreover, while the Man-
ual's pre-execution disclosure rule in theory streamlines the admis-
sibility process for survey evidence, actual experience of litigants
who voluntarily disclose survey plans does not unequivocally
demonstrate the effectiveness of such a procedure.
Pre-survey disclosure effectively prevented successful challenges
to the survey results from the opposing party at both the trial and
appellate level in Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc. 196 In that
trademark infringement action, Piper sought to utilize survey evi-
dence to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the minds of con-
sumers between its parts and parts manufactured by the defendant.
Prior to undertaking "the great expense of conducting an actual
survey,"' 97 Piper filed a motion in limine asking the court to deter-
194 Id. at 430 (footnotes omitted).
195 1985 MANUAL, supra note 48, § 21.484.
196 741 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1984).
197 Id. at 929.
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mine the admissibility of its proposed survey. 198 The questions and
preliminary results were given to the court.' 99 Defendant opposed
the motion, claiming that the putative respondents constituted an
improper universe, that the survey process incorrectly used defend-
ant's 1982 rather than 1980 catalogue, and that the survey results
were hearsay. 2° ° The court rejected each of defendant's arguments
and granted Piper's motion, holding that the survey results merely
recorded the present sense impression and existing state of mind of
the respondents and, hence, were admissible under Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(1) and 803(3); that the universe selected was accepta-
ble; and that the 1982 catalogue served as an adequate basis for
survey questions. 20 ' The trial court cautioned, however, that it
would entertain a motion to strike at trial if Piper failed to establish
"'the interviewers' credibility to the court's satisfaction.' "202 The
final survey was conducted just three days before trial.20 a
After a bench trial, during which the court admitted Piper's sur-
vey as " 'probative evidence demonstrating the likelihood of confu-
sion,' " the court granted Piper's request for injunctive relief.2' On
appeal, defendant's challenge to the admissibility of the survey fell
on deaf ears. In response to defendant's argument that it did not
have an opportunity to conduct discovery of the final survey results
prior to trial, the appellate court was impressed with the fact that
Piper followed the "'commendable procedure'" of submitting the
survey questions and preliminary results to the trial court for an in
limine ruling on admissibility.2 ' 5 The court opined:
The district court properly reserved until trial the question of the
weight it would give to the survey. Although we do not condone
plaintiff's postponement of the full survey until the eve of trial,
the possibility that settlement could be reached without a trial
makes the postponement understandable, due to the great costs
involved in conducting a full-scale survey. Additionally, from
the discovery undertaken with respect to the preliminary survey,
defendant knew exactly what the format and content of the final
survey would be. Thus, there was no surprise attendant upon the
admission of the survey into evidence, and the fact that plaintiff
198 Id.
199 Id. This procedure was initially advocated by the Seventh Circuit in Union Car-
bide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 386 (7th Cir. 1976).
200 Piper Aircraft, 741 F.2d at 930-31.
201 Id. at 929-30.
202 I d. at 929.
203 Id. at 931.
2
04 Id. at 929.
205 Id. at 931.
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did not produce the full survey prior to trial, if prejudicial to
defendant, as tardy production of evidence sometimes could be,
was not sufficiently so as to call for reversal.20 6
Similar efforts to avoid an unfavorable evidentiary ruling by sub-
mitting the proposed survey questions to the court did not prove as
successful for the survey's proponent in Union Carbide Corp. v.
Ever-Ready, Inc. 207 As in Piper, the trial judge issued a pre-trial
ruling that the survey results would be admissible, but that the
weight to be accorded the results would be determined at trial.2"8
Unlike in Piper, however, the trial court ultimately determined that
bias and other problems in the survey entitled the results " 'to little,
if any, weight.' ,12' However, the court of appeals reversed the low
probative value assigned by the trial court to the survey. The court
held that the bias in the survey would not likely "reduce to insignifi-
cance the extremely high percentage of [consumer] confusion
shown by the survey. "210
While the results in Piper and Union Carbide demonstrate some
advantage to the survey proponent in seeking pre-execution input
from the court, the in limine rulings sought in those cases are a far
cry from the process which the 1985 Manual advocates as
mandatory. Indeed, the in limine approach fosters the adversarial
nature of offering and opposing evidence, while the system sug-
gested by the Manual requires a concerted, unified effort by liti-
gants and respective experts to devise the definitive survey.
Accordingly, only the threshold question of admissibility of the sur-
vey is answered by the in limine ruling, with the issue of the weight
accorded the results left unresolved until thorough examination and
cross-examination in court. In contrast, the accord reached by the
litigants, their experts, and the court under the Manual procedure
would, at least in theory, leave little ground for challenging the sur-
vey evidence at trial. A "super class" of evidence would emerge
which, by definition or default, would be regarded as extremely pro-
bative, potentially excluding any consideration by the court or jury
of other valid, probative evidence on the same issue.
The Manual's mandatory disclosure approach finds some sup-
port in Union Carbide's suggestion that the "desirable procedure
would be for the parties to attempt in good faith to agree upon the
206 Id. at 931.
207 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
2 0 8 Id. at 386.
20 9 Id.
2 10 Id. at 388..
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questions to be in such a survey. ' 211 Unlike the Manual, the Union
Carbide decision, perhaps more firmly rooted in reality, does not
nominate this procedure as an inflexible prerequisite to admissibility
of survey evidence. Indeed, it is somewhat naive to assume that
legal counsel can function as compatriots in the preparation and
execution of survey results--especially when such cooperation will
likely produce evidence dispositive of key issues in the litigation-
while remaining partisan adversaries in all other matters.212 More-
over, under Federal Rule of Evidence 705213 and the liberal discov-
ery rules,2 14 failure to disclose prior to executing a survey will not
unduly prejudice opposing counsel's ability to prepare for trial.
Stated differently, absent extreme ineptitude on the part of opposing
counsel in conducting discovery, there should be no surprises re-
garding the proffer of polling data at trial. Furthermore, a very real
danger exists that the parties will fail to reach agreement on any of
the steps of the survey process, necessitating a much greater degree
of judicial intervention than is warranted during the evidence gath-
ering phase of litigation.
In short, while the proponent of survey evidence stands to benefit
from early disclosure of the intent to conduct a survey, and possibly
even from agreeing with opposing counsel upon the questions to be
asked,2 15 cooperation between the respondent and opposing counsel
2111d. at 386.
212 As one commentator observed:
The adversary system almost induces opposing counsel to misrepresent or ma-
nipulate facts before the Court. The primary goal of the advocate is, after all,
to achieve a favorable legal decision even at the expense of empirical truth.
For that matter, the courtroom setting, with its ringing tones of partisanship,
is not the ideal place to examine social science findings.
P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 202 (1972).
213 Rule 705 states: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the un-
derlying facts or data on cross-examination."
In the author's experience, courts do not hesitate to order disclosure of the underly-
ing data during the discovery phase; in any event, Rule 705 mandates disclosure on
cross-examination of the opponent's expert.
214 For instance, FED. R. Civ. P. 26 allows "discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action," even
where the information sought would be inadmissible at trial, provided the discovery
request "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
More specific rules governing the discovery of an expert's opinion and the grounds for
the opinion are set forth in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
215 See, e.g., Dreyfuss Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1116
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (in preliminary injunction hearing, court gave no weight to plain-
tiff's survey results due to errors in execution; court indicated that survey would be
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should not be mandated.216
D. Determining the Proper Degree of Attorney Involvement
Unlike the Pittsburgh Press Club standards which require that
"the survey must be conducted independently of the attorneys in-
volved in the litigation, ' 217 the criteria for polling evidence set forth
in the various editions of the Manual does not caution against at-
torney involvement. Indeed, the stated rationale for the 1985 Man-
ual's recommendation of mandatory advance disclosure is
antithetical to Pittsburgh Press Club's prohibition against attorney
involvement. This conflict arises because the Manual perceives the
opportunity for both parties, as well as the court, to participate in
the design and execution of the survey as a benefit. In contrast,
Pittsburgh Press Club apparently viewed any degree of attorney in-
volvement in the survey process as detrimental to the trustworthi-
ness of a survey.218
A court's consideration (or lack thereof) of attorney involvement
can determine the weight given to particular survey results or even
the admissibility of the evidence. For example, the court in Ameri-
can Home Products Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc. 219 excluded
accorded weight if flaws were corrected in final study and suggested, but did not man-
date, that the parties make a good faith attempt to agree upon the final survey
questions).
216 An alternative to mandating cooperation among the litigants and their experts is a
court-appointed, independent expert pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 706. The court's inher-
ent power to appoint an expert was recognized prior to the codification of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, see, e.g., Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Bryant-Buckner Assocs., 333
F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd after remand, 372 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 907 (1967), but is generally used only when the judge believes additional expert
input is needed to fairly resolve a case. See, e.g., Stickney v. List, 519 F. Supp. 617 (D.
Nev. 1981) (past director of state corrections department appointed as expert in suit
challenging prison conditions; expert asked to report on prisons' eighth amendment
responsibilities to furnish adequate food, clothes, and sanitation). In jury cases, the
court's reluctance to appoint an expert is premised on the fear that the "presence of a
court-sponsored witness, who would most certainly create a strong, if not overwhelm-
ing, impression of 'impartiality' and 'objectivity,' could potentially transform a trial by
jury into a trial by witness." Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Mich.
1980).
217 Pittsburgh Press Club, 579 F.2d at 758. This requirement was originally sug-
gested, without elaboration, by the Judicial Conference Study Group in its Handbook of
Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Litigation. Id. (citing 25 F.R.D.
351, 429 (1960)).
218 Pittsburgh Press Club did not offer a rationale for disfavoring attorney involve-
ment, but did categorize this requirement as "j]ust as important" as sound sample
design, questionnaire formation, and interviewing techniques. Id.
219 656 F. Supp. 1058 (D.N.J. 1987), aff'd, 834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987).
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proffered survey results on a number of grounds, including the de-
gree of attorney involvement.22 In that case, plaintiff claimed that
defendants violated state and federal trademark laws by selling 200
milligram over-the-counter Ibuprofen tablets of a color similar or
identical to that of plaintiff's 200 milligram Advil tablets. Plaintiff
offered the results of a consumer survey which purported to demon-
strate, among other things, that defendant's use of the Advil color
created a likelihood of confusion as to the commercial source of
defendant's product.221
Placing "the burden [on] the proffering party to prove the quality
of [the] survey evidence, '222 the court carefully scrutinized the sur-
vey expert's testimony concerning selection of the universe, design
of the questions, and the method used to elicit responses from the
interviewees. 22 While noting deficiencies in the sampling tech-
niques used, 224 the court was also troubled by pre-survey confer-.
ences between the expert and plaintiff's counsel,225 even though the
expert deemed such meetings necessary to insure that the survey
would be responsive to the legal issues.
226
The court deciding American Home Products is not alone in its
reluctance to give credence to survey results where attorneys in-
volved in the litigation actively participated in the design and execu-
tion of the survey. In Delgado v. McTighe,227 for example, plaintiffs
surveyed law schools inquiring about the ethnicity of their gradu-
ates in an effort to pursue a class action. The court rejected the
proffered survey results for failure to meet the Pittsburgh Press Club
criteria for admissibility, noting that:
The evidence at the class certification hearing clearly showed
that the survey was not conducted independently of the attorneys
involved in the litigation. Plaintiffs' counsel was actively in-
volved in designing the form of the survey, sending the forms to
the law schools, and collecting the data when it was returned to
220 American Home Prods., 656 F. Supp. at 1070.
221 Id. at 1062.
222Id.
22 3 Id. at 1070-71.
22 4 1d. at 1070.
225 Id.
226Id.
22791 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also Boehringer Ingelheim G.m.b.H. v.
Pharmadyne Laboratories, 532 F. Supp. 1040, 1058 (D.N.J. 1980) (Refusing to admit
survey data, the court opined that "[o]ne problem with the survey was that plaintiffs'
attorneys were involved in designing the questions that were to be asked. . . . This
conflicts with the admonition in Pittsburgh Press that surveys be designed without gui-
dance from lawyers.").
HeinOnline  -- 70 Or. L. Rev. 507 1991
OREGON LAW REVIEW
his office.... For these [and other] reasons, the survey might
lack the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" neces-
sary for it to be admissible in evidence.228
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the Pittsburgh Press
Club requirement that surveys be conducted "independently" of the
attorneys involved in the litigation is the previously criticized
229
American Greetings 230 case, which allowed admission of a survey
designed entirely by plaintiffs' counsel. There, the court rational-
ized that "[w]hile not dispositive, this fact renders plaintiffs' survey
somewhat less weighty than it might otherwise be."' 23 1 In a twist on
the American Greetings rationale, defendants in another case ar-
gued (unsuccessfully) that plaintiff's survey (designed to show the
generic nature of the "monopoly" trademark) was inherently flawed
because it had been devised "without the mediation of a trademark
attorney."
232
A court's reading of bias into any survey where the proponent's
counsel provides input places the attorney in a precarious position.
If counsel maintains a "hands off" approach to the survey, a very
real danger exists that the results will prove irrelevant to the specific
and perhaps narrow legal or factual issues involved. Indeed, critical
stages such as universe selection and question formation beg for gui-
dance from competent legal counsel familiar with judicial guidelines
on these points.233 As one court observed, in excluding the results
of a survey of retail luggage dealers on the grounds that the percep-
tions of the ultimate customers, rather than the dealers polled, were
relevant: "Those who designed the survey apparently did not fully
appreciate the legal consequences of the point that there were at
issue in this case two markets .... 234
This is not to say that overzealous participation by counsel in a
survey should go unnoticed; in fact, mechanisms exist which safe-
guard against bias that may result from too much attorney input.
The most obvious of these are pretrial discovery and cross-examina-
22 SDelgado, 91 F.R.D. at 81.
229 See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
230 American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1204 (D.N.J.
1985), vacated in part on other grounds, 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
23 1 American Greetings Corp., 619 F. Supp. at 1215-16.
232 Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1325 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
233 See supra notes 62-96 and accompanying text.
234 American Luggage Works, Inc. v. United States Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp. 50, 52
(D. Mass. 1957), aff'd sub nom. Hawley Prods. Co. v. United States Trunk Co., 259
F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1958).
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tion of the expert or witness through whom the survey results are
proffered. Both procedures provide ample opportunity to deter-
mine the nature and degree of attorney involvement and the corre-
sponding impact, if any, on the survey results.
The Pittsburgh Press Club requirement that surveys be conducted
independently of legal counsel is unreasonable and counterproduc-
tive. It is unrealistic to assume that lay people, even pollsters with
extensive experience as expert witnesses, can precisely define the
proper universe and frame the definitive question(s) without some
input from legal counsel. In a system where the omission of a single
word from a question can lead to exclusion of survey results at
trial,2 35 and where the proper universe is defined by a subtle yet
critical difference in the point in time when respondents are inter-
viewed,236 every step of the survey should be reviewed and evalu-
ated by the commissioning attorney in light of governing law.
Indeed, in view of the costs incurred by the client in conducting a
survey and the potentially high probative value which a credible
survey enjoys on dispositive issues, it may well constitute legal mal-
practice for the attorney to take a completely hands-off approach.
As implicitly suggested in the foregoing discussion, the goal is to
allow sufficient attorney involvement to assure a legally and factu-
ally relevant survey without condoning excessive "guidance" by
counsel which constitutes a thinly-disguised effort to bias the survey
results in the client's favor. When allegations of bias surface, cross-
examination of the witness who offers the results is an appropriate
mechanism for discrediting the results. Only in the most extreme
situations should the court step in and exclude the survey evidence
altogether. In any event, contrary to the inference clearly drawn
from the Pittsburgh Press Club "independence from counsel" rule,
an attorney's involvement in the survey should not automatically
carry a presumption of untrustworthiness.
E. Conditioning Admissibility of a Survey upon a
Showing of Necessity
In view of the previous discussions in this Article, it is clear that
235 See, e.g., American Footwear Corp. v. General Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 661
n.4 (2d Cir. 1979) (proper question would have asked, "With whom or what do you
associate a Bionic boot?"; not just the word "Bionic"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951
(1980).
236 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 118 (2d Cir.
1984) (proper universe consisted of people contemplating purchase of plaintiff's product
in near future, not those who had recently purchased plaintiff's product).
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admissibility of survey results hinges primarily upon the presence of
circumstantial guarantees of the data's trustworthiness. 237  An
equally critical issue frequently mentioned by the courts is whether
admission of polling evidence must be further justified by a "show-
ing of necessity." Such a requirement is met by the proponent's
demonstration that the survey evidence is "more probative on the
issue than any other evidence" which could be obtained through
"conventional methods." 238
In Keith v. Volpe ,239 an action was brought against a city for fail-
ing to approve construction of housing for people with low and
moderate incomes who were displaced by freeway construction.
The Ninth Circuit fully entertained defendant's argument that
plaintiffs' survey of the racial and economic status of affected per-
sons should be excluded as unnecessary because similar data was
available from the 1980 federal census and other surveys.240 The
court concluded, however, that since the data available from other
sources was two to five years out of date, "the information in the
[plaintiffs'] survey was more probative of the current composition of
the areas in question and thus much more probative on the issue of
adverse impact.",
24 1
Like the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" require-
ment, the "showing of necessity" requirement serves, in an appro-
priate case, as a prerequisite to admissibility.242 Unlike the
trustworthiness criterion, however, the necessity factor is seldom
elaborated upon by the courts. The lack of clear guidance on the
necessity requirement is due in large part to the courts' usual prac-
tice of initially determining whether a survey is inherently trustwor-
237 See generally 1 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.712 (1982).
238 See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir.
1978); see also Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405, 1413 (11th Cir. 1984) (court
accepts argument by plaintiff's expert that while methods other than the survey proce-
dures used were available to obtain information on the instructional validity of the high
school competency test at issue, the survey evidence was necessary because the other
methods were "either impractical, prohibitively expensive, or less reliable"); Toys "R"
Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (court
accepts "necessity and genuine guarantees of trustworthiness to be the correct bases for
receiving survey evidence" offered to establish likelihood of confusion in consumers'
minds resulting from defendant's adoption of store name similar to that owned by
plaintiff).
239 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 61 (1989).
240 Id. at 480.
241 Id.
242 Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25
F.R.D. 351, 428 (1960).
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thy; obviously, if a poll or survey is deemed inadmissable because
trustworthiness is lacking, the issue of necessity is moot.243
Adding to the confusion as to when a showing of necessity is re-
quired is the failure of many courts to cite the specific grounds or
rule under which the survey data is admitted, other than stating
that the survey must be trustworthy. 2" This omission may simply
reflect the degree of acceptance which survey evidence has attained
in general, or constitute an implicit recognition of the need for sur-
vey data in cases where the public's perception of an item or event is
determinative. For instance, use of survey evidence is usually the
norm in cases involving allegations of trademark infringement and
other acts of unfair competition,245 false advertising,2 " and even
obscenity prosecutions.247 Indeed, several decisions characterize a
party's failure to submit survey data as a concession of weakness in
the party's position.24
243 In Delgado v. McTighe, 91 F.R.D. 76, 80 (E.D. Pa. 1981), for example, the court
stated that the proffered survey data would be admissible, if at all, only if it met all of
the requirements of FED. R. EvID. 803(24), including the showing that the survey was
more probative than other available evidence. Because the survey failed the threshold
trustworthiness test, however, there was no need for the court to undertake the neces-
sity analysis.
244 See, eg., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Dreyfuss Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 525 F.
Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Burmah-Castrol, Inc.,
504 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
245 See, e.g., Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons,
523 F.2d 1331, 1341 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[t]here is substantial authority to support the
admissibility of properly conducted surveys in trademark infringement cases"); Dreyfuss
Fund, 525 F. Supp. at 1116 ("Surveys are frequently used in trademark litigation and
are recognized by courts as a way of demonstrating secondary meaning or a likelihood
of confusion."); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, 216 F. Supp. 670, 684 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (recognizing "scientific survey" as preferred method of establishing state of mind
of consumers regarding challenged goods in trademark infringement and unfair compe-
tition cases).
246 See, e.g., FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 41 (D.C. Cir.
1985) ("consumer surveys conducted by independent experts may arguably constitute
the best way to establish consumer understanding"); Quaker State, 504 F. Supp. at 182
("If an advertisement is not facially false, then plaintiff must demonstrate that consum-
ers receive false or misleading advertisement by the use of expert testimony and survey
research data.").
247 See, e.g., State ex rel. Pizza v. Strope, 54 Ohio St. 3d 41, 46, 560 N.E.2d 765, 770
(1990) (citing with apparent approval statement by court of appeals that survey results
regarding residents' tolerance for sexually oriented materials "was the most relevant
and probative evidence presented" in obscenity prosecution); Saliba v. State, 475 N.E.2d
1181, 1185 (Ind. App. 1985) (recognizing that testimony based on survey results "is
uniquely suited to a determination of community standards. Perhaps no other form of
evidence is more helpful or concise .... ").
248See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 361 (2d Cir.
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Regardless of the reason for the lack of guidance on the necessity
requirement, the dearth of judicial discussion on this point leaves
both the attorney contemplating the commissioning of a survey and
the judge considering the admissibility of survey data at a clear dis-
advantage. While the nonchalance with which courts dispense with
or insist upon a showing of necessity is always troublesome, lack of
uniform treatment of this factor is especially problematic where the
proffered use of the survey evidence is a novel one.
For instance, in a products liability case predicated upon the al-
leged failure of the manufacturer of alcoholic beverages to warn
consumers of the purported dangers of excessive consumption,249
the defendant might consider commissioning a public opinion poll
designed to measure the existing level of consumer awareness of the
health hazards associated with excessive consumption. Arguably,
survey results demonstrating a high level of consumer awareness
serve to negate any duty on the manufacturer's part to supply addi-
tional warnings;25 but, since failure to warn has traditionally been
established through expert testimony without reference to litiga-
1983) (plaintiff's petition for preliminary injunction denied because plaintiff failed to
"undertake some form of survey of consumer attitudes under actual market conditions"
to establish consumer confusion or secondary meaning) (citation omitted); Monsanto
Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1965) (court
advises that plaintiff should have used opinion poll to show injury to its trademark
which allegedly resulted from defendant's actions), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966);
Broadcasting Publications, Inc. v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 309, 318-19 (S.D.
Fla. 1983) (failure to submit survey evidence demonstrating actual consumer confusion
deemed highly relevant by court in rejecting plaintiff's claims of trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition); Information Clearing House, Inc. v. Find Magazine, 492
F. Supp. 147, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (In denying plaintiff's claim of trademark infring-
ment, court observed that "[i]t is also significant that plaintiff, though possessed of the
financial means, did not undertake a survey of public consumer reaction to the products
under actual market conditions.").
249 In Shuput v. Heublein, Inc., 511 F.2d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 1975), for example,
the court held:
The duty to warn .. does not extend to a perfectly obvious hazard but we do
not consider this to be such a case. The propensities of bubbly wine may be
well known to many but are not a matter of such common knowledge as to be
established as a matter of law and imposed as a matter of judicial knowledge.
Id. The author suggests that a well-constructed and executed survey designed to mea-
sure actual levels of consumer awareness of the effects of defendant's product might
have pursuaded the court that any "danger" associated with consumption of the prod-
uct was obvious, and thus negated any obligation on the part of defendant to provide
additional warnings. For a comprehensive discussion of the duty to warn generally
imposed on manufacturers, see Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Con-
tours and Criticism, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 103 (1988).
250 See Davis, supra note 1, at 346-47.
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tion-specific surveys,25' the proponent may be required to show the
probative superiority of polling evidence over more "conventional"
methods of proof. Failure to make such a showing could result in
exclusion of the survey results.252 Thus, indiscriminate application
of the necessity requirement would create an arbitrary and unin-
tended barrier to legitimate and creative uses of survey data.
Several questions beg answers when the necessity requirement is
examined. First, what is the genesis of this requirement? Second,
why is it not uniformly required as a threshold test for admissibility
of polling data? Finally, should it be uniformly adopted as a
threshold requirement?
The precise origin of the necessity requirement is not difficult to
identify. Certainly, the common-law requirement, now reflected in
Federal Rule of Evidence 402, that evidence must be relevant to be
admitted, paired with Rule 401's definition of relevant evidence,
253
implicates a requirement for some showing of necessity for all evi-
dence proffered. Requiring a higher standard of probative value for
polling evidence can be attributed in part to the suspicion with
which survey evidence has been historically viewed.254
As the judiciary became more comfortable with the use of survey
evidence, it was admitted not only through reliance on common-law
exceptions to the hearsay rule, 255 but also under the rationale that
admissibility was proper, even where the survey did not fit precisely
within an established hearsay exception, upon a showing of neces-
sity and trustworthiness. The 1960 Handbook advocated this ap-
proach,256 and further advised: "Proof of necessity does not require
a showing of total inaccessibility to proof of the facts desired to be
shown, but the offeror must show the impracticability of making his
proof by conventional methods., 257 To a large extent, the Hand-
251 See Epstein & Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony in Product Liability
Actions, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 656, 661 (1987).
252 See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, 216 F. Supp. 670, 683 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (holding that necessity "requires a comparison of the probative value of the sur-
vey with the evidence... which... could be used if the survey were excluded"). This
test, as articulated by the Zippo court in 1963, was endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in
1988 in Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 480 (9th Cir. 1988).
253 FED. R. EvID. 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
254 See infra section II.F.
255 Zippo, 216 F. Supp. at 683.
256 Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25
F.R.D. 351, 428 (1960).
257 Id. (footnote omitted).
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book merely advocated extending to survey evidence the well-estab-
lished common-law principle allowing admission of evidence which
did not fit with precision into an established hearsay exception, as
long as necessity and trustworthiness were demonstrated. 258 Deci-
sional law embraced this suggestion and began to justify admission
of survey evidence as long as a "need for the statement at trial" was
shown, and the "circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness sur-
rounding the making of the statement" was demonstrated.25 9
Indeed, just three years after the Handbook was published, the
oft-cited Zippo court observed that "well reasoned authority" justi-
fied admission of survey results under the following rationale:
[T]he determination that a statement is hearsay does not end the
inquiry into admissibility; there must still be a further examina-
tion of the need for the statement at trial and the circumstantial
guaranty of trustworthiness surrounding the making of the state-
ment.... Necessity in this context requires a comparison of the
probative value of the survey with the evidence, if any, which as
a practical matter could be used if the survey were excluded. If
the survey is more valuable, then necessity exists for the survey,
i.e., it is the inability to get 'evidence of the same value' which
makes the hearsay statement necessary.
260
Codification in the mid-1970s of the Federal Rules of Evidence
adopted the evidentiary avenues paved by common law for admis-
sion of survey evidence, primarily the present sense impressions ex-
ception of Rule 803(1),261 the existing state of mind exception of
Rule 803(3),262 and the residual exception of Rule 803(24).263
While no specific showing of need is required for admission of state-
ments which reflect a present sense impression or existing state of
mind, the residual exception requires an express determination by a
court that the hearsay statement offered is "more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the pro-
258 The "necessity" requirement appears to have been originally drawn from 2 J.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§§ 1421-23 (1904). See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 F. 515, 518
(2d Cir. 1913) (Judge Learned Hand writes for the court that "the requisites of an
exception of the hearsay rule[ ] [are] necessity and circumstantial guaranty of trustwor-
thiness."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y.
1940) ("when hearsay evidence is offered it is admissible if resort to it be essential in
order to discover the truth and if the surroundings persuade the court that the informa-
tion ... is reliable").
25 9 See Zippo, 216 F. Supp. at 683.
260 Id. (footnotes omitted).
261 See supra note 48 for text of Rule 803(1).
262 See supra note 42 for text of Rule 803(3).
263 See supra note 49 for text of Rule 803(24).
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ponent can procure through reasonable efforts. ' 264
Based on the language of the Rules, it is tempting, but unwise, to
conclude that courts will only require a showing of necessity where
Rule 803(24) provides the grounds for admissibility of survey data.
The imprecise language used by the courts when discussing the ad-
missibility of polling evidence prohibits the drawing of any such
bright-line test.
In Pittsburgh Press Club, for example, the court listed the hearsay
exceptions available to a proponent of hearsay evidence (i.e., present
sense impression, existing state of mind, and residual hearsay), and
then added: "In other words, the survey is admissible if it is mate-
rial; if it is more probative on the issue than any other evidence; and
if it has 'circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' .. . .,265
Although the quoted language was possibly intended to refer solely
to admissibility under the residual exception, the decision is hardly
a model of clarity on this point. In any event, the survey of finan-
cial data in Pittsburgh Press Club would be admissible, if at all, only
under the residual hearsay exception. It is therefore curious that
the exhaustive guidance provided to the court below did not address
whether the specific survey at issue in the appeal met the "more
probative ... than other evidence" criterion identified earlier in the
Third Circuit's opinion.2 66 This omission is especially puzzling
since the task confronting the trial court on remand included ruling
on the admissibility of additional survey evidence.267
The confusion surrounding the necessity requirement can largely
be resolved by the court clearly citing the specific rule of evidence
upon which it determines admissibility of the survey at issue, fol-
lowed by literal interpretation of the cited rule.
F Considering Different Standards for the Admission of Surveys
which Measure Objective and Subjective Data
If, in fact, a showing of necessity is (or should be) required only
where admission of survey evidence is grounded in the residual
hearsay exception, another irony surfaces. If a survey attempts to
record respondents' beliefs or mental impressions-a measurement
which is arguably more difficult to measure than objective facts-
then the proponent has a strong argument for characterizing the
2 64 FED. R. EVID. 803(24)(B).
265 Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 758 (1978).
266 See id. at 760-63.
2 67 Id. at 762 n.22.
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results as present sense impressions or existing states of mind.
Under these two hearsay exceptions, the Federal Rules of Evidence
require no showing of necessity.26 If, however, the survey purports
to record objective facts, such as the racial and economic status of
individuals displaced by the freeway in the Keith case, responses
which intuitively seem more reliable, then the proponent bears the
higher burden of establishing necessity as a prerequisite to
admissibility.
The 1981 Manual distinguishes between surveys which collect
objective data, such as color, number, and size, and polls measuring
subjective data, "such as beliefs, opinions, or motivations of the in-
terviewees." '269 According to the 1981 Manual, the former, "if
properly conducted, possess sufficient elements of trustworthiness
to be admitted;, 270 but with the latter type of data, the Manual
cautions, trustworthiness may be lessened. Thus, "the showing of
necessity in such a case should be stronger and the question of trust-
worthiness should be more carefully scrutinized."'271 In general, de-
cisional law neither makes this distinction nor imposes different
levels of necessity, but rather scrutinizes surveys recording objective
and subjective data in the same manner.
2 72
The survey at issue in Pittsburgh Press Club, for instance, pur-
ported to collect objective data on the use of the club's facilities by
its members. The survey consisted of eight questions, including:
"Did you, as a member of the Press Club host a party, banquet or
meeting?" and, "Was the party, banquet or meeting a social event
for your personal guests?" Respondents were asked to check "yes"
or "no" to each inquiry without providing additional comments.
Thus, the club members were asked to provide data of a factual
nature which was based on external events capable of measurement
on an objective scale. It is therefore interesting to observe that the
standards under which the Third Circuit critiqued the survey have
268 See supra text accompanying notes 261-63, discussing FED. R. EVID. 803(1), (3)
& (24).
269 1981 MANUAL, supra note 105, at 115. The 1985 MANUAL does not explicity
address the objective/subjective distinction, but states that polls which question individ-
uals' observations, attitudes, beliefs, and motivations, i.e., subjective measurements, "re-
quire special attention." 1985 MANUAL, supra note 48, § 21.484, at 89.
270 1981 MANUAL, supra note 105, at 115.
2 7 1 Id. at 116.
272 The lack of sensitivity displayed by jurists is evidenced by the nomenclature used
in their opinions; that is, the word "survey," which could easily be designated as a term
limited to measurement of objective data, is used synonymously with "opinion poll,"
which suggests a collection of subjective data.
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been widely adopted in cases involving subjective responses to sur-
vey questions.27 a
The Manual's recommendation that a distinction be recognized
between surveys recording objective and subjective data finds some
support from social scientists. As two experts on survey question
design explain, questionnaires are traditionally relegated to one of
two categories: those which record behavior or facts (objective), and
those which seek to capture psychological states or attitudes (sub-
jective).274 The first group includes characteristics of things, events,
and people which have already occurred and which are, at least in
theory, capable of external verification.2 75 In contrast, responses to
subjective questions "are not verifiable even in principle, since states
or attitudes exist only in the minds of the individuals and are di-
rectly accessible, if at all, only to the individuals concerned. '276
A call for a different, lower level of scrutiny of objective data
presupposes that the line between objective and subjective data is
easily drawn. However, social scientists caution that this is not al-
ways the case.2 77 Many questions regarded as "factual," including
employment status, marital status, and ethnic and racial identifica-
tion, have a subjective component. 27' Furthermore, despite the the-
oretical possibility of validating external events, modem survey
techniques do not include independent checking by the interviewer
to confirm the objective information provided by respondents.279
Moreover, the same factors which present potential for error in re-
cording subjective data, such as memory, motivation, communica-
tion, and knowledge, do not evaporate when the information sought
is objective in nature.28 °
273 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987) (sur-
vey offered to show confusion in minds of consumers regarding origin of defendant's
reel); United States v. Local 560, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985) (membership's perception
of union management recorded in survey); Saliba v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1181 (Ind. App.
1985) (poll proffered to establish community standards against which allegedly obscene
material should be evaluated).
274 S. SUDMAN & N. BRADBURN, supra note 61, at 17.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277See 1 SURVEYING SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA, supra note 6, at 10-14.
278 H. SCHUMAN & S. PRESSER, supra note 9, at 1.
279 For instance, a poll designed to determine the number of people who jog and the
frequency of their running does not require the interviewer to surreptitiously follow
respondents for a week or so to verify their responses.
280 That is, material may be forgotten, or the time at which something happened
may be remembered incorrectly; respondents may be motivated not to tell the
truth because of fear of consequences or because they want to present them-
selves in a favorable light; respondents may not understand what they are be-
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In addition to the difficulty a court will encounter in attempting
to distinguish between "objective" and "subjective" survey data,
and the recognition that, even if distinguishable, both types are sus-
ceptible to similar infirmities, a further problem arises in divining
different levels of scrutiny for polling data based on a categorization
of the results. There is no litmus test against which the trustworthi-
ness or inherent credibility of any evidence, including survey data,
can be measured.
There is no way to delineate, at least not with any acceptable
degree of precision, the variation in degree of review which a court
should apply to objective and subjective survey results. Certainly,
the suggestion in the 1985 Manual that subjective data "be more
carefully scrutinized" does not offer a workable standard. In short,
the existing standards, which focus upon each step of the survey-
formation, execution, and analysis of results-apply comfortably to
both objective and survey data. Thus, there is no need for a court to
devise different yardsticks against which polls recording objective
and subjective data should be measured.
III
SUGGESTIONS FOR A HARMONIZED APPROACH
A. Case Law: A New Attitude
Making the observation that courts are still struggling with the
evidentiary rules governing survey evidence does little to aid the
cause. So wherein lies the solution? Two possibilities are immedi-
ately apparent: (1) judiciary adoption of a hybrid approach to stan-
dards set forth in the Manual for Complex Litigation and the
Pittsburgh Press Club decision, paired with a re-examination of the
courts' role vis-a-vis the expert when Rule 703 is called into play;
and (2) construction and adoption of a new rule of evidence which
reconciles the points of conflict discussed in this Article (and per-
haps others not identified herein), and which explains, either in the
text of the rule or the advisory committee notes accompanying the
rule, the relationship between the new rule and existing rules such
as Rule 703.
The first, and perhaps easier, solution begins with an explicit rec-
ognition by the courts and litigants that survey evidence is neither a
ing asked and answer the question in terms of their own understanding; and
finally, they may just not know the answer to the question and answer it with-
out indicating their lack of knowledge.
S. SUDMAN & N. BRADBURN, supra note 61, at 19.
[V€ol. 70, 1991]
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superior type of evidence deserving of admission in every case nor
an inherently inferior class of evidence which the courts are free to
ignore. Second, the judiciary should re-examine the standards ar-
ticulated in the 1960 Handbook, the subsequent Manuals, and deci-
sions such as Zippo and Pittsburgh Press Club, in light of advances
in the technology of polling methodology, the well-established util-
ity of polling evidence in certain substantive areas of law, and po-
tential uses in other areas, in order to reaffirm the existing standards
which make sense and to reject those which do not.
A revaluation by the courts will result in standards wherein: (1)
attorney involvement will not be inherently suspect; (2) litigants
will be required to divulge survey results to opposing counsel early
in the discovery phase, but will not be required to disclose a mere
intent to conduct a survey; (3) no distinction will be made for
surveys which purport to measure objective as compared to subjec-
tive data; (4) litigants will be required to defend each step of the
survey data as comporting to accepted survey methodology; (5)
courts will not place an unduly heavy burden of demonstrating ne-
cessity (i.e., that the survey data is the most probative evidence on
point) upon a litigant advocating a novel use of polling evidence;
and (6) rubber-stamping of admittedly flawed survey evidence
under the "weight versus admissibility" rationale will be eliminated,
resulting in exclusion of noncredible survey results. Moreover, fol-
lowing careful reflection, courts may cease to (improperly) cite Rule
703 as an alternative ground for admission of survey results as sub-
stantive evidence, but will allow appropriate deference to an expert
whose opinion is based in part on survey evidence without sending
the survey data through the hearsay threshing machine.
B. Legislative Solution: A New Rule of Evidence
An alternative method for resolving the issues discussed herein,
and perhaps others not directly addressed, is the drafting and adop-
tion of a new rule of evidence which codifies, revises, and clarifies
current evidentiary standards governing survey evidence. A pro-
posed rule, drafted to ameliorate the concerns raised throughout
this Article, is set forth immediately below.2 '
281 The author does not purport to be a pioneer in proposing such a rule. Indeed, a
suggestion was made shortly after the rules were enacted that such an amendment to
the Federal Rules of Evidence was warranted. See Note, Opinion Polls, supra note 1, at
1132-33. The author also does not pretend to present the definitive draft of an appropri-
ate rule; rather, this draft is intended primarily as a springboard for discussion as to the
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Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 807: Admission of Public
Opinion or Survey Evidence:
(1) If a poll or survey constitutes a minor amount (i.e., less
than fifty percent) of the information, material, or data upon
which an expert relies in forming an opinion to be offered at trial
and the poll or survey is not being offered as substantive evi-
dence, then admissibility of the expert's opinion is permitted as
provided pursuant to Rule 703, without the necessity for the
court to scrutinize the poll or survey for independent guarantees
of trustworthiness. Upon timely request from counsel, the court
shall instruct the jury that the survey results do not constitute
substantive evidence in the case.
(2) Where an expert bases his opinion solely or substantially
(i.e., more than fifty percent) upon a poll or survey, or where a
party seeks admission of poll or survey results as substantive evi-
dence without the testimony of an expert witness, the court shall
scrutinize the methodology employed which produced the poll or
survey results for circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
The criteria against which the methodology is judged shall in-
clude, but need not be limited to, the following factors:
(a) The design and execution of the poll or survey, as well
as any analysis of the results of the poll or survey, were ac-
complished through significant input from a person or per-
sons qualified as an expert in the field of polling or
surveying;
(b) A proper universe of respondents was identified;
(c) A statistically significant number of respondents
within the relevant universe were polled;
(d) Individual questions were drafted to avoid leading the
respondents or producing otherwise biased responses;
(e) The order in which questions were asked was
designed to avoid leading the respondents or producing
otherwise biased responses;
(f) The medium selected for conducting the interviews
(telephone, mail solicitation, face-to-face interviews, or any
combination thereof) was appropriate for the type of infor-
mation sought;
(g) Persons conducting the interview were trained in the
art of interviewing and were unaware of the purposes for
which the information was being gathered;
(h) Respondents were not aware of the purposes for
which their responses were being solicited;
(i) The questionnaire and individual questions were
pretested to determine potential sources of confusion, bias,
or other error which could occur during the interviewing
process, and necessary corrections made;
(j) Field work by interviewers was closely monitored by
need for such a rule and, in the event such a need is identified, to provide a starting
point for drafting purposes.
[Vol. 70, 1991]
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those responsible for the design and implementation of the
poll or survey;
(k) Collection and processing of the data were done in
accordance with accepted mathematical and/or statistical
procedures containing sufficient safeguards to minimize the
potential for error; and
(1) Conclusions drawn from the poll or survey were in
fact supported by the poll or survey results.
(3) In the event that the poll or survey satisfies some, but not
all, of the indicia of trustworthiness set forth in subsection (2),
the trial court must make an express determination of whether
the flaws are of such magnitude as to render the survey or poll
results unworthy of any consideration, and thus subject to exclu-
sion from evidence, or whether the flaws are of a nature and
magnitude that the poll or survey results should be admitted into
evidence, with the deficiencies taken into account by the trier of
fact in determining the weight to be accorded the evidence.
(4) Involvement in the design or execution of a poll or survey
by the attorney representing the proponent of the survey evi-
dence shall not constitute sufficient reason for excluding such ev-
idence, unless opposing counsel can demonstrate that said
involvement directly biased or otherwise improperly influenced
the results of the survey or poll at issue in favor of the proponent.
(5) In a proper case, the court may appoint an expert to con-
duct a poll or survey pursuant to Rule 706.
(6) A party who intends to conduct a poll or survey for use in
litigation need not disclose this intent prior to execution, but
must disclose to opposing counsel at the earliest time practicable
the results of any poll or survey,
(a) Upon which the party's expert will base an opinion at
trial, or
(b) The party will seek to introduce as substantive evi-
dence at trial. Failure to disclose the results in a timely fash-
ion shall be grounds, within the court's discretion, for
exclusion of the poll or survey results.
(7) No showing is required by the proponent of poll or survey
results that the evidence is more probative upon a point of fact or
law than other available evidence. This provision in no way su-
persedes or modifies other requirements for admissibility, such as
the prohibition in Rule 402 against the admission of irrelevant
evidence, or the discretion accorded the trial court under Rule
403 to exclude evidence under circumstances described in that
rule.
CONCLUSION
The potential use of polling and survey data for both the social
science and legal disciplines is virtually unlimited. Properly crafted
questions, posed to a relevant group of respondents, can greatly en-
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rich the breadth and depth of our understanding of human thought
processes and our perception of the world around us. Whether the
information harvested is limited in application to the degree of con-
sumer confusion in a trademark infringement case, or offers a mea-
sure of public sentiment directly impacting the enactment and
interpretation of laws governing life and death issues such as capital
punishment, public opinion polls and surveys will continue to re-
flect, and to a certain extent redefine, the legal and social environ-
ment in which we act and interact. Accordingly, this type of
evidence should not be subjected to the conflicting and confusing
standards by which its admissibility and weight are evaluated in
courtrooms today.
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